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The Road to Bedlam:* Evidentiary
Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceedings
Daniel W. Shuman **
I. Introduction
In contrast with the dearth of judicial intervention into civil commitment
of the mentally ill prior to 1968,1 the past decade has witnessed an explosion of
litigation concerning the procedural and substantive rights of the mentally ill.2
Whatever may be the precise current parameters of these rights,3 civil commit-
ment entails a deprivation of liberty which is cognizable under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 Those
courts which have addressed the evidentiary requirements compelled by the
due process clause in the context of a civil commitment hearing, have required
* Bedlam was the popular name for St. Mary of Bethlehem, a place of confinement devoted to the in-
sane. R. Hunter and I. Macalpine, Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry, 1535-1860 (1963).
*. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. J.D., University of Arizona, 1972.
1 See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. See also Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor Change,
2 MEN. Dis. L. REP. 57, 58 (1977). This latter publication contains the legislative guide of the Mental
Health Law Project, a private organization sponsored by the American Ortho-
psychiatric Association, the Center for Law and Social Policy, and the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation. The legislative guide will be used throughout this article in examining alternative responses to
particular issues.
2 Compare the remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972):
"Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional
limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated." Two lawsuits which have exemplified
this litigation are: Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1973), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on procedural
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
3 A prerequisite to the analysis of the state's power to civilly commit a person because of mental illness
is the answering of certain core questions bearing on the very existence of the power to commit persons
under any circumstances for mental illness. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme
Court raised, but did not answer, certain fundamental questions concerning the existence or proper use of
this power. "We need not now decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be
confined by the State. ... " Id. at 573.
Subsequently, in Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979), the Court stated, without citation of
authority or supporting analysis:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority
under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are
mentally ill.
Notwithstanding this recognition of the parens patriae and police power justifications for civil commitment,
the question "when, or by what circumstances, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State" is still
largely unanswered.
4 99 S. Ct. at 1809; 422 U.S. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,
608 (1967); Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1193-1201.
5 Implicit in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804
(1979), that civil commitment proceedings require the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard of
persuasion, is a recognition that an adversary hearing where evidence which will be adduced and subse-
quently tested by the clear and convincing evidence standard is also constitutionally required. This conclu-
sion is not weakened by the Court's subsequent decisions in Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979), and
Secretary of Pub. Welfare ofPa. v. InstitutionalizedJuveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979), which held that adver-
sary proceedings are not constitutionally required for commitment ofjuveniles to state mental institutions
by parents. Conscious of its decision in Addington only two months earlier, the Court carefully limited its
holding in Parham, 99 S. Ct. at 2496, and Secretary of Public Welfare, 99 S. Ct. at 2524, to minor children
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the use of evidentiary rules applicable in other judicial proceedings. 6
Moreover, numerous state legislatures have amended their state statutes to re-
quire the use of traditional evidentiary rules in civil commitment proceedings. 7
These judicial or legislative determinations to utilize the rules of evidence
in civil commitment proceedings are not, however, the final answer to the
questions of evidentiary requirements for commitment proceedings. Rather
they serve to usher in a host of other issues-a second generation of issues per-
taining to civil commitment of the mentally ill. To clarify the issues raised by
the interface of rules of evidence and civil commitment it is helpful to engage in
certain preliminary observations of each.
An event is in dispute in a pending lawsuit. The fact-finder can never ac-
quire "unassailably accurate knowledge" of that past event; rather, the best
that might be expected is to acquire knowledge of what probably happened.
8
To maximize this probability two cardinal principles have been accepted as the
basis for any rational system of evidence: "(1) that nothing is to be received
[into evidence] which is not logically probative of some matter requiring to be
proved; and (2) that everything which is thus probative should come in, unless
a clear ground of policy or law excludes it.' ' 9 A major determinant of those
rules of evidence which have resulted in the exclusion of probative evidence is
the policy which seeks to protect juries from evidence thought to be beyond
their capacity to evaluate properly.' 0 The assumptions which underlie exclu-
sion of evidence based upon jury incapacity have been subjected to increased
whose parents sought institutional mental health care for the children. Moreover, the Court's reasoning in
these cases is bottomed upon the "traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their
child[ren]." 99 S. Ct. at 2505. Because commitment of adults does not turn upon parental decision-making,
"adults facing commitment to mental institutions are entitled to full and fair adversarial hearings in which
the necessity for their commitment is established to the satisfaction of a neutral tribunal." Id. at 2516 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The civil commitment hearing referred to here and discussed throughout this article is the "full hear-
ing" as contrasted with a preliminary hearing used to scrutinize a brief period of confinement prior to the
opportunity to conduct the "full hearing." See Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1275-82. For a discus-
sion of some of the issues raised by the preliminary hearing, see Note, "We're Only Trying to Help": The
Burden and Standard of Proof in Short Term Civil Commitment, 31 STAN. L. REv. 425 (1979).
6 Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1127 (D. Hawaii 1976) ("rules of evidence applicable in
criminal cases"); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb. 1975) ("The Court cannot discern a
rational basis for admitting evidence in a final civil commitment hearing which would be inadmissible in
criminal trials."); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974) ("[R]ules of Evidence ap-
plicable to other judicial proceedings"); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1103 ("rules of evidence
generally applicable to other proceedings in which individual's liberty is in jeopardy"); Holm v. State, 404
P.2d 740, 745 (Wyo. 1975) ("the court shall consider... itselfbound by the rules of evidence..."). See also
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967).
7 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-9 (5) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-539(D) (1974);
IDAHO CODE § 66-329(h) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, 5 2334(4)(C) (1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1304(4)( 0 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. S 83-1059 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03.1-19 (1978); S.C. CODE § 44-17-570 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(5) (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(c) (1976).
Other legislatures have provided, without specific reference to evidentiary rules, that the procedures for
commitment of the mentally ill will be the same as the procedures utilized in other judicial proceedings.
COL. REv. STAT. 5 27-10-111(1) (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. 5 16-5006(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-14-9.1-13 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A)(15) (Page Supp. 1977).
From this it may be reasonably inferred that the evidentiary rules utilized in other judicial proceedings
within these jurisdictions, as an aspect of their adjudicatory procedures, are applicable to civil commitment
proceedings.
8 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring.)
9 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 530 (1898).
10 J. THAYER, supra note 9, at 508-09. Another policy which results in the exclusion of probative
evidence is that of privilege which seeks to protect certain relationships by rendering the contents of rela-
tional communications immune from judicial disclosure. See text accompanying notes 56-154 infra.
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scrutiny.1 ' As a result, a shift towards an assumption of greater jury sophistica-
tion with a concomitant bias in favor of admissibility has occurred. 12 This
predilection towards receipt of evidence is also supported by the availability of
discovery and other pretrial procedures designed to avoid surprise at trial.
Consequently, counsel are able to take those steps prior to trial necessary to
respond to evidence in a manner which will permit the fact-finder to evaluate it
properly.1
3
Against this background, procedures for civil commitment of the mentally
ill, which often hold the potential of confinement for life,' 4  have
characteristically lacked rigorous judicial scrutiny or zealous patient
advocacy. 15 Without questioning the reliability of documents received into
evidence, the foundation for conclusory expert testimony, or the expertise of
the purported experts, counsel and court would, more often than not, function
as the legal rubber stamp of approval for unchallenged medical judgments.
1 6
Recent judicial and legislative decisions constitute a mandate for change of this
situation.17
To what extent are the reforms which have taken place in the law of
evidence outside civil commitment appropriate for civil commitment, so long a
stepchild of the legal system? Are more restrictive evidentiary requirements
necessary for commitment or will the more liberal approach to the receipt of
evidence suffice? These critical questions require an analysis of predictable
evidentiary issues in civil commitment proceedings.1
8
II. Which Road to Travel?
A. The Justification for Traditional Evidence Rules
The deprivation of liberty which results from an order of commitment
gives rise to the constitutional arguments in favor of applying general eviden-
tiary rules to civil commitment proceedings. The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment are clearly implicated in such
arguments. The due process argument suggests that a judicially sanctioned
11 Weinstein, Preface to E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE at xi (5th ed. J.
Weinstein 1976).
12 Preface to IJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BURGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE at iii (1978) [hereinafter cited as
WEINSTEIN].
13 Id.
14 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1193.
15 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 428-30
(1966); Wexler & Scoville, Special Project-The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practice in Arizona,
13 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 51-60 (1971).
More recently the legal representation of virtually all persons committed in Milwaukee County who
were represented by a closed panel of attorneys was found to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, No. 441-417 (Wis. County Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1976), appeal dismissed, 75
Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).
16 Wexler & Scoville, supra note 15, at 51-60.
17 See notes 4 and 6 supra.
18 The choice of evidentiary rules applicable in state judicial proceedings is in large measure left to the
discretion of the state, a point recently reaffirmed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, although the
judicial system of each state should focus upon the same issues, the resolution by each state of these issues
will differ. Rather than attempting to analyze each state system, this article will primarily utilize the recently
codified Federal Rules of Evidence as a vehicle for discussing approaches to particular problems.
[Vol. 55:53)
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deprivation of liberty requires filtration of the evidence through the traditional,
judicially applied rules of evidence. None of the courts which have concluded
that due process considerations require application of traditional judicial
evidence rules have articulated why those rules need apply rather than some
other less formalistic system of evidentiary rules. 19
The assumption which must underlie a rejection of a less formalistic
evidentiary system 20 is that each judicial evidentiary rule is required by the due
process clause in all judicial proceedings involving the potential for loss of life,
liberty, or property. Although many rules, such as the hearsay rule, are in
whole or part supported by due process considerations, 21 other evidentiary
rules are supported by considerations other than due process. The rules ex-
cluding offers to compromise 22 or evidence of subsequent repairs, 2' and
limiting cross-examination to the subject matter of direct examination illustrate
these competing considerations. 24 Thus, where wholesale incorporation of
judicial evidentiary rules falters under due process analysis, the equal protec-
tion analysis provides additional constitutional support for application of tradi-
tional evidentiary rules in commitment proceedings.
Under the equal protection analysis, the mere fact that an individual rule
is not supported by due process considerations is not fatal. If the rule has been
regularly applied in other judicial proceedings, equal protection scrutiny would
focus upon the existence of a rational basis for disparate application of the rule
in commitment proceedings. 2 Under such an analysis, one might question the
use of less stringent standards for admission of expert medical testimony in
commitment than in criminal or personal injury actions. Because the rational
basis test may not result in the most demanding scrutiny, it is conceivable that
certain bases for distinction could survive equal protection scrutiny.
In addition to these constitutional supports, a less legalistic, and perhaps
more appealing argument exists for application of traditional judicial eviden-
tiary rules. "[T]o the extent that the rules of evidence are not merely technical
or historical, but like the hearsay rule have a sound basis in human experience,
they should not be rejected in any judicial inquiry." 26 The appliction ofjudicial
evidentiary rules is most clearly supported in Lessard v. Schmidt27 and Suzuki v.
Quisenberry.28 Thus, if the constitutional arguments in favor of traditional
judicial evidentiary rules are found lacking, extra-constitutional considerations
justify application of the rules of evidence in civil commitment proceedings.
19 See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 394; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
20 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976).
21 Hearsay-Confrontation and Due Process, 56 F.R.D. 183, 291 (1973) (Advisory Committee overview of
the approach to hearsay taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
22 FED. R. Evm. 408, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 227 (1973) (encouragement of compromise
in the settlement of disputes).
23 FED. R. EviD. 407, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225-26 (1973) (encouragement of safety
measures or at minimum avoidance of discouraging safety measures).
24 FED. R. EvID. 611(b), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 274 (1973) (orderly management of the
trial).
25 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
26 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 795
(1966), quoted with approval in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 11 n.7.
27 349 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
28 411 F. Supp. at 1130.
[October 1979]
EVIDENTIARY GUIDEPOSTS
B. Civil or Criminal Rules
The opinion of the federal district court in Suzuki v. Quisenberry29 which re-
quires that civil commitment proceedings be conducted according to the "rules
of evidence applicable in criminal cases" 30 and that of the federal district court
in Doremus v. Farrell" which requires exclusion of evidence in commitment pro-
ceedings "which would be inadmissible in criminal trials" 32 raise a preliminary
issue-which rules of evidence should apply, those applicable in criminal or
civil cases? To answer this question it is useful to pose another preliminary
question-are there different rules of evidence for civil and criminal cases? In
those jurisdictions without codified rules of evidence, such as Hawaii, the
judicial response has been that the "general rules as to the admissibility of
evidence are the same in criminal as in civil proceedings.' 33
Where systems of evidentiary rules have been codified, as for example in
the Federal Rules of Evidence,3 4 the rules have been expressly made applicable
in civil and criminal cases. 35 Such dual application is consistent with those of
the draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence36 and
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 37 What then accounts for the perception ex-
emplified in Suzuk* 8 and Doremus"9 that there are different rules of evidence in
civil or criminal cases?
One author suggests that this perceived difference can be explained by the
fact that certain rules arise primarily in criminal trials. 40 More probably,
however, certain constitutionally compelled procedural requirements give rise
to the most vivid differences in the procedures for trials of civil and criminal
cases. Perceptions that there are different rules of evidence in civil and criminal
cases result from such constitutional procedural requirements as the standard
of persuasion, 4 1 the privilege against self-incrimination,4 2 and the confronta-
tion clause. 43 As will be explained, each of these constitutionally engendered
concerns can and should be considered separately from general rules governing
the admission of evidence.
44
The "standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the fact finder
29 Id. at 1127.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975).
32 Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
33 State v. Danforth, 73 N.H. 215, 220, 60 A. 839, 842 (1905). Accord, State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 555,
67 A.2d 298, 305 (1949); State v. Heavner, 146 S.C. 138, 143 S.E. 674 (1928). See also United States v.
Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 469 (1827).
34 28 U.S.C. app. (1976).
35 FED. R. EvID. 1101(b). But see FED. R. EvD. 2 01(g), 301, 302, 404, 501, 601, and 803(8).
36 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 1(1) and 2 (1942).
37 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 101 and 1101(a). But see Harvey, The Uniform Rules ofEvidence asAffected
by the Federal Constitution, and as Accepted by One State, 29 MONT. L. REV. 137 (1968), which argues in favor of
separate rules of evidence in civil and criminal cases.
38 411 F. Supp. at 1127.
39 407 F. Supp. at 517.
40 I.F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1, at 1 (13th ed. 1972). As an illustration the author notes the
rules which apply to the defendant's prior conviction and evidence of the defendant's character or reputa-
tion. Id.
41 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44 Curiously, although the opinion in Suzuki concludes that criminal evidence rules apply, the opinion
discusses the standard of persuasion, privilege against self-incrimination, and confrontation as separate re-
quirements. 411 F. Supp. at 1127, 1130-32.
[Vol. 55:53]
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concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. 45 The
standard functions independently of the rules that govern receipt of evidence.
In applying a particular standard of persuasion, the fact-finder's decision to
return a verdict for one party or another turns upon that which has been re-
ceived into evidence and only indirectly on that which has been rejected and is
therefore not now available to support or upset a verdict. 46 Recently the
Supreme Court decided that the appropriate standard of persuasion for use in
civil commitment proceedings is the "clear and convincing" standard. 47 The
framing of this standard does not affect the threshold requirements for the
receipt of evidence at trial. Thus, the standard of persuasion and the rules
governing admission of evidence may be considered separately.
Whether one may invoke the protections of the privilege against self-
incrimination contained in the fifth amendment does not turn upon the judicial
context in which the privilege is asserted but rather upon the consequences
which may flow from compelled testimony. 48 Whether the amendment's pro-
tection should be applicable to commitment proceedings is an issue separate
from other aspects of the standards for receipt of evidence. 49 Accordingly, the
self-incrimination clause is not germane to this analysis.
Another constitutional protection distinguishing trials in civil and criminal
45 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46 It might be argued that where society demands a higher degree of correctness a more rigorous stan-
dard of threshold admissibility should be employed. For example, where the eyewitness to an event is a
chronic alcoholic who has twice been convicted of perjury we might wish to permit his testimony in a civil
case but not a criminal case because his testimony fails to satisfy a minimal standard of threshold reliability.
Exclusion of this testimony, however, leaves us with a less complete picture of the event at issue and
therefore with a lesser probability that its judicial reconstruction will be correct. Additionally, the standard
of persuasion recognizes that error in the fact-finding process will occur and incorporates the societal de-
mand that its negative consequences fall in particular patterns-equally on the parties in civil litigation and
on the government in criminal cases governed by the reasonable doubt standard. A higher threshold of ad-
missibility would not serve this goal.
47 Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. at 1809. The Addington decision is troubling for several reasons. First,
the Court fails to recognize any difference in the standard which should result where the commitment is
based upon the police power versus parens patriae model. The standard of persuasion reflects a societal judg-
ment concerning the consequences of an erroneous decision. This judgment should be affected by the
specific type of danger an erroneous release may pose, the amenability of a particular disorder to treatment,
and the aversive nature of the treatment for the particular disorder.
Second, the Court fails to address the potential length of deprivation of liberty in relationship to the
standard of persuasion. Addington involved an indefinite commitment. Should a different standard of persua-
sion be applied to commitments of finite duration? The Court specifically recognizes that the standard of
persuasion reflects societal concerns with liberty, yet it fails to condition the standard on the extent of the
deprivation-short-term emergency, temporary, or indefinite.
The Court recognizes that the formulation of the standard of persuasion must consider not only the pa-
tient's interest in liberty but society's interest in reducing dangerousness through confinement and treat-
ment. What is particularly disturbing about this aspect of the opinion is that its author, Chief Justice
Burger, fails to follow through with the analytical precision he demonstrated in his concurring opinion in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1976).
In O'Connor, Burger reviewed the available literature which suggested that treatment for the involun-
tarily committed patient has not been effective. 422 U.S. at 584. Curiously in Addington, Burger has
neglected to refer to the available literature which suggests that commitment is not likely to be effective in
reducing societal dangerousness because of prediction problems and that involuntary treatment has not
been shown effective. See notes 132-35 infra. If these state interests are not likely to be served in civil commit-
ment proceedings, a reexamination of the balance struck by the Court between the individual and state in-
terest should occur.
48 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
49 The application of the privilege against self-incrimination to civil commitment proceedings is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 173-227 infra.
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cases is the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.5 0 Recent opinions
considering the protections of the confrontation clause in light of long-standing
exceptions to the hearsay rule have concluded that, although both are intended
to serve much the same purpose, the confrontation clause is not a constitu-
tionalized hearsay rule.5 1 Evidence which falls within an exception to the hear-
say rule may not survive scrutiny under the confrontation clause.5 2 Converse-
ly, nonexclusion under the confrontation clause does not automatically result
in immunity from exclusion under the hearsay rule.5 3
In light of this less than complete overlap, the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence wisely chose to separate the confrontation clause from the hearsay
rule.5 4 Survival of scrutiny under the hearsay rule simply exempts the evidence
from exclusion under the hearsay rule. Scrutiny under the confrontation clause
may still take place. No cogent reason exists to vary that approach with respect
to civil commitment. 55 Whether the confrontation clause applies to commit-
ment may therefore be discussed separately from the hearsay rule.
Thus the constitutionally compelled procedural requirements which often
distinguish civil and criminal trials do not require different sets of rules govern-
ing the admissibility of evidence. Rather, where these constitutional re-
quirements are applicable, they necessitate another level of scrutiny of
evidence prior to its admission or they do not at all bear upon admission of
evidence. In either case there is but one road even though additional tolls may
occasionally be assessed for different travelers.
III. The Signs Along the Way
A. Psychiatric Testimony
1. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Civil commitment proceedings, whether utilizing some form of need of
treatment5 6 or danger standard, 57 require that the fact finder address the pa-
tient's present mental health and future mental health without commitment.
Courts" and legislatures 59 have articulated a need for psychiatric60 input to ad-
50 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor ......
51 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Those who find this
conclusion and its consequences less than satisfying may find solace in Graham, The Confrontation Clause and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 94 (1972).
52 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
53 399 U.S. at 156.
54 Hearsay-Confontation and Due Process, 56 F.R.D. 183, 292 (1973). See also United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 76 (2d Cir. 1977).
55 For a discussion of the application and requirements of the confrontation clause in the context of civil
commitment, see text accompanying notes 284-308 infra.
56 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1201-07.
57 Id.
58 E.g., In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 105, 301 A.2d 493, 494 (1973) ("[I]n a commitment pro-
ceeding ... the court is in effect bound by the expertise of the psychiatrist .... ).
59 Most states require a pre-hearing medical examination to be performed by a physician. S. BRAKEL &
R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 50 (1971).
60 Throughout this article the problems of physician testimony in commitment proceedings will be ad-
dressed as a question of psychiatric testimony.
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dress these issues in commitment proceedings. Although the desire for
psychiatric testimony in these proceedings is understandable, the obligatory
aspect of such testimony in many jurisdictions 61 and the unprecedented judicial
deference to such testimony are remarkable. 62 This combination of cir-
cumstances heightens the importance of scrutinizing the conditions for receipt
of psychiatric evidence.
Psychiatrists will ordinarily require some degree of familiarity with the pa-
tient if they are to assist the court in a civil commitment proceeding. 63 There
are a variety of possible ways in which the psychiatrist can acquire sufficient
firsthand knowledge 64 of the patient to aid the court in a resolution of the issues
raised by the proceedings. The following hypotheticals represent some predic-
table patterns which may arise in commitment proceedings and are set forth as
vehicles for further analysis of the problems which arise from psychiatrist-
patient relationships and judicial testimony. (1) A patient may have volun-
tarily65 chosen to seek private outpatient psychiatric care with a particular
psychiatrist. Subsequently, the patient's condition may have deteriorated to
the point that someone 66 instituted commitment proceedings and this
psychiatrist is subpoenaed to testify. (2) Following the institution of pro-
ceedings for commitment, a psychiatrist may have been appointed by the court
to examine the patient to render an opinion concerning the patient's commit-
tability. 67 (3) A psychiatrist treating an involuntary inpatient 68 may be called
upon to testify at a judicial review or recommitment proceeding. To varying
degrees, each of these hypotheticals poses the question whether the manner in
which the psychiatrist acquired information concerning the patient should be
cloaked with a privilege which would give the patient the right to preclude the
introduction of any or all testimony by that psychiatrist.
61 In Texas, for example, the state constitution requires that commitments be supported by "compe-
tent medical or psychiatric testimony." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15a.
62 Wexler & Scoville, supra note 15, at 60. This study of commitment proceedings in Arizona found that
doctors' recommendations were followed in 97.9% of the commitment proceedings in Phoenix, Arizona,
and in 96.1 % of the commitment proceedings in Tucson, Arizona.
63 This assumes that the psychiatrist applies his knowledge and experience to the patient's situation and
offers his opinion on the patient's condition. Conceivably, the psychiatrist might simply expound certain
principles of psychiatric wisdom leaving the judge or jury to apply these to the facts of the case. FED. R.
Evm. 703, ADV. COMM. NOTES, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973).
64 Rheingold, The Bases of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1962). Three categories of informa-
tion may provide the bases for expert opinion in a judicial proceeding-firsthand observation, trial
testimony, and information from third parties outside of the trial. Id. at 480.
65 Even voluntary treatment is potentially coercive. It is questionable if a patient can be considered
"voluntary" when his purpose in seeking psychiatric help is to avoid extreme psychological pain, incarcera-
tion, or the loss of a professional license. S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 314 (1967).
Moreover, in the context of voluntary psychiatric hospitalization, the "voluntary" hospitalization of a
child by a parent or of a ward by a guardian cloaks such proceedings with a label that belies reality. See
Gilboy & Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429 (1971). But see Parham
v.J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979), and Secretary of Pub. Welfare ofPa. v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct.
2523 (1979), where the Court concluded that an adversary proceeding is not constitutionally required before
a minor child may be administered institutional mental health care at the request of a parent or guardian.
66 See Tarasoffv. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 432, 551 P.2d 334, 341, 131 Cal. Rptr.
13, 21 (1976), discussed at note 121 infra, which raises questions of privilege.
67 Although local practice may vary, this factual scenario assumes that even if the patient is ultimately
committed, he will have no further contact with this examining psychiatrist.
68 For a discussion of the right not to receive treatment, see Schwartz, In The Name of Treatment:
Autonomy, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975); Developments in
the Law, supra note 1, at 1344.
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The primary function of a trial is to shed light on those matters at issue. 69
Accordingly, a principal tenet of a rational system of evidence is the desire to
receive evidence probative of those matters at issue. 70 Other social policies
may, however, conflict with the desire to receive probative evidence. For exam-
ple, in certain circumstances, nondisclosure of information which is probative
of issues in the case is thought to be essential to the protection of a relationship
to which society ascribes great importance. The result of a balance struck in
favor of nondisclosure of information arising out of this relationship is a
privilege which provides a right to limit judicial disclosure of the communica-
tions.7 1 This balancing has resulted in rules of privilege which have been ap-
plied to a panoply of different relationships, including attorney-client,
72
husband-wife, 73 priest-penitent, 74 and physician-patient.
75
Historically the notion of a physician-patient privilege has been accorded
a less than cordial reception. The common law recognized no privilege which
could prevent the physician from being compelled to reveal probative informa-
tion learned from a professional relationship. 76 Accordingly, only legislative ac-
tion would suffice to protect such communications from compelled judicial
disclosure. 77 Although this common law rule has been abrogated in a majority
of states by physician-patient privilege statutes, 7 the privileges created by
these statutes have been so riddled with exceptions that the protection they pro-
vide is slight.79 These exceptions have responded to the multitude of commen-
tators who have, with varying degrees of ferocity, attacked the desirability of a
69 FED. R. EVID. 102. As the language of the rule implies, however, the search for truth is tempered by
a multitude of other factors. See Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials, 66 COL. L. REv. 223, 241 (1966).
70 E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974):
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated ifjudgments were to be founded on
a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of
the rules of evidence.
71 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447-48 (1938):
They do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather they shut out the light. Their
sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded
as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the
administration ofjustice.
Not all persons who have analyzed evidentiary privileges agree that they are exclusionary rules triggered by
a balancing analysis. Professor Louisell has contended instead that privileges are primarily "a right to be let
alone . . . in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory powers,"
and only incidentally result in the exclusion of evidence. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 100, 110-11 (1956).
72 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW 9 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
73 Id. S 2332.
74 Id. S 2394.
75 Id. S 2380.
76 See Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Trials, 355, 573 (1776). But seeAllred v. State, 554 P.2d
411 (Alas. 1976).
77 See text accompanying notes 155-72 infra, concerning potential constitutional analogs to the
physician-patient privilege. Note that the formal ethical limitations imposed upon the psychiatrist as a
member of the medical profession create no barrier to compelled judicial disclosure. The ethical limitation
on revelation of patient confidences specifically excepts disclosure required by law. Section 9 of the Prin-
ciples of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association, 130 AM. J. PsYcH. 1058, 1059 (1973).
78 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, S 2380, at 819 n.5.
79 Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REv.
649 (1974); Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals For Change, supra note 1, at 339.
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physician-patient privilege and its application in a multitude of contexts.8 0
To evaluate the wisdom of a particular privilege one must balance the in-
terests of the relationship sought to be protected through nondisclosure against
the interests of the judicial system in obtaining this information. In an effort to
advance this analysis Wigmore suggested that any valid privilege should be
capable of satisfying four conjunctive conditions:85
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
Wigmore82 and others8 3 have concluded that the physician-patient privilege
does not satisfy these requirements. Except in a narrow category of illnesses
such as venereal disease, Wigmore hypothesizes, patients do not themselves
cloak their illness from the public. 84 The absence of any documented statistical
differences in the seeking of medical care either pre- and postenactment of a
privilege statute within a jurisdiction or from one privileged to a nonprivileged
jurisdiction belies the notion that people are deterred from seeking medical care
for fear of judicial disclosure in the absence of a privilege. 85 And, although
Wigmore agrees that the physician-patient relationship should be fostered, 86 he
concludes that the injury to this relationship occasioned by disclosure does not
outweigh the benefit derived from disclosure on the "correct disposal of litiga-
tion. ''87
The failure of the general physician-patient privilege to satisfy Wigmore's
analytical hurdles88 has been distinguished insofar as the practice of psychiatry
is concerned where, it is argued, Wigmore's four conditions are satisfied.
89
80 E.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the
Witness Stand, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Ladd, A Modem Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213 (1942); Long,
The Physician-Patient Privilege Statutes Obstruct Justice, 25 INS. Co. J. 224 (1958); Morgan, Suggested Remediesfor
Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHi. L. REV. 285 (1944); Purrington, An Abused
Privilege, 6 COL. L. REv. 388 (1906).
81 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, § 2285, at 527.
82 Id. § 2380a, at 828.
83 See note 80 supra.
84 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, § 2380a, at 829. Moreover, in this situation a number of states have
concluded that the public health requires an exception to the privilege so that the spread of venereal disease
might be abated. Id.
85 Id. at 829-30.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 527.
88 Wigmore opines that a strong medical lobby and not a more acute analysis of the problem is respon-
sible for the physican-patient privilege statutes in a majority of states. Id. at 831.
89 Although Wigmore does not himself undertake an analysis of the privilege as applied to psychiatrists,
numerous other commentators have. They have found that psychiatry survives scrutiny under Wigmore's
criteria. FED. R. EvIs. 504, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973); Guttmacher & Weihofen,
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People will not seek out or be candid with or trust a psychiatrist unless com-
plete confidentiality exists. 90 Unlike the broken arm or ruptured appendix,
those conditions for which psychiatric help is sought are often so sensitive and
potentially embarrassing that without protection from disclosure the patient
will not seek assistance. 91 This personal discomfort is compounded by the
stigma society attaches to mental illness. 92 Full disclosure by the patient is an
essential ingredient of effective treatment and without a guarantee of non-
disclosure, it is argued, this baring of the soul cannot take place. 93 And, even if
the necessary information is gained without the necessity of a privilege, the
need for patient trust in the psychiatrist is antithetical to any subsequent
disclosure. 94 Thus Wigmore's first two criteria for the establishment of a
privilege are satisfied. The communications originate in confidence and that
confidence is essential to the purposes of the relationship. With regard to
Wigmore's third and fourth criteria, the relationship is one which should be
fostered and many believe that the harm to the patient and the patient-
psychiatrist relationship from judicially compelled revelation is greater than the
injury to the judicial process.
95
If the concept of a psychiatrist-patient privilege is accepted, when does this
privilege arise and what exceptions to its application should obtain? More
specifically, should it apply in civil commitment proceedings and, if so, to what
set of psychiatrist-patient relationships? In those jurisdictions which accord the
psychiatrist-patient relationship a privileged status, 96 not all communications
Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. LJ. 32, 33-35 (1952); Louisell & Sinclair,
Foreword to The Supreme Court of California, 1969-1970, 59 CAL. L. REv. 30, 52 (1971); Slovenko, Psychiatry and
a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-94 (1960); Symposium: Evidentiary Privileges of
Non Disclosure, 33 CONN. BJ. 170, 198 (1959).
90 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d at 459, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39
(Clark, J., dissenting).
91 M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952); Slovenko, supra note 89, at
184.
92 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1200.
93 M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 91, at 270-71; Plaut, A Perspective on Confidentiality, 131
AM. J. PSYCH. 1021, 1022 (1974). Although the theoretical appeal of this argument is greater in the context
of psychiatry than in the context of the general practice of medicine, the statistical support for its application
here is equally deficient. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L.
REv. 1025, 1034 (1974). No proponent of the psychiatrist-patient privilege has yet to cite a study
demonstrating a higher use rate of psychiatrists or a lower incidence of mental illness where that relationship
has been accorded a privileged status. But see Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profes-
sionals: Its Implicationsfor the Doctrine of Privileged Communications, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1255 (1962), in which a
written questionnaire asked participants if they would confide in a psychiatrist if their disclosures would be
subject tojudicial revelation. The flaw in this study is, inter alia, that it focuses respondent's attention on the
possibility, if not the probability, of disclosure. Query whether most prospective psychiatric patients con-
template the occurrence ofjudicial proceedings wherein their disclosure may be relevant and then evaluate
the status of the privilege in their jurisdiction prior to making the disclosures. The decision to create a
privilege to protect against compelled judicial disclosure should test this critical assumption.
94 17 Cal. 3d at 458, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting).
95 These arguments were favorably received by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence who re-
jected a general physician-patient privilege but accepted the concept of psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Proposed FED. R. EvID. 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973). The rule defines psychotherapist functionally to
include a physician and psychologist engaged in the treatment of mental or emotional conditions. The tex-
tual discussion does not distinguish application of the privilege where the therapist is a psychologist rather
than a psychiatrist because the need for the privilege, or absence thereof, arises not from the therapist's
credentials, but from the therapist's function in the relationship.
96 Psychiatrists are included not only within psychiatrist or psychotherapist-patient privilege statutes,
but also medical doctors within those privilege statutes applicable to physicians generally. 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 72, S 2382, at 835 n.5.
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in all relationships are covered by the privilege. 97 Only where the purposes
sought to be obtained by the privilege are present is the information com-
municated accorded a protected status. Because the primary purpose of the
privilege is to encourage candid disclosures to aid in the seeking and receipt of
treatment, 98 the first requisite for application of the privilege is that the rela-
tionship be established for treatment or for diagnosis in contemplation of im-
mediate treatment. 99 Conversely, where the sole purpose of the relationship is
an examination without regard to treatment, for example by an employer's
physician as a precondition of employment 00 or by an insurance company's
physician to ascertain the insured's health as a precondition to issuance of a
policy, 10' confidences are not revealed so that the patient may be effectively
treated and the privilege is therefore not applicable. 0 2 The second condition
for the privilege to apply is that the information communicated'0 3 during the
course of the relationship must be necessary for the treatment or diagnosis of
the patient.1 0 4 The precise ways in which these general conditions apply to the
psychiatrist-patient relationship is analytically complex and must be explored.
a. Voluntary Treatment
In the first relationship the patient contacted the therapist on a private
outpatient basis whereupon a series of psychotherapeutic encounters oc-
curred. The patient's condition deteriorated and someone then instituted pro-
ceedings for commitment. If the psychiatrist is subpoenaed to testify and is
questioned about the patient's communications'0 5 during the therapy session,
should a timely objection to such testimony based upon privilege be sustained?
Such a scenario would appear to present a paradigm case for application of the
privilege if the privilege is recognized in the jurisdiction. The sole purpose of
the relationship is treatment and the hypothetical assumes that the communica-
tions at issue are essential to that purpose. The answers which have been given
to this question, however, are surprising.
One of the earliest voices for according the psychiatrist-patient relation-
97 For a more exhaustive treatment of the general requirements, see C. DEWIr, PRIVILEGED COM-
MUNICATIONs BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (1958); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 98-105 (2d ed. 1972); 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at §§ 2380-2391.
98 Arizona and N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 677 (1915); C. DEWITr, supra note 97, at 25.
99 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 99, at 213.
100 Cherpeski v. Great N. Ry., 128 Minn. 360, 150 N.W. 1091 (1915).
101 Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 S.W.2d 1094 (Mo. 1939).
102 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 99, at 214.
103 Where the pertinent statute refers to "communications," its coverage may be limited to oral or writ-
ten expressions that are intended to be communications. Many courts, however, reject such a narrow con-
struction. Where the statute refers to "information," it should be interpreted to include information
gleaned through observation and examination as well as oral or written expression intended as communica-
tion. Id. at 215.
104 Id. A variety of factors may defeat the privilege such as the presence of nonessential third parties dur-
ing the communications. Id. at § 101.
105 Whether the psychiatrist is asked the specific content of the patient's statements on a particular topic
(e.g., threats to harm himself or another) or his opinion concerning committability which draws upon these
statements should be of no moment insofar as the privilege is concerned. In each instance the psychiatrist is
called upon to disclose patient communications, in the first situation directly and in the second as translated




ship a privileged status was the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. 10 6
Yet the first exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege the Group ultimately
proposed provides:
§ 3 Exceptions
There is no privilege for any relevant communications under this act
(a) when a psychiatrist, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient,
determines that the patient is in need of care and treatment in a hospital
for mental illness; .. 0.. 7
Since it is unlikely that commitment would be sought when the patient's
psychiatrist concludes it is unnecessary, or that the state would call such a
psychiatrist as a witness, the proposed privilege is virtually nonexistent in the
commitment setting. The decision to except patient communications when
relevant to an issue in commitment proceedings was also reached by the
drafters of the Model Code of Evidence, 10 8 the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 0 9
and the proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.110  Similarly, Arkansas,11 1  California, 112  Florida, 113  Kansas, 114
Maine,1 1 5 and Nebraska1 6 have adopted versions of the Uniform Federal
Rules of Evidence with the same exception to the privilege for civil commit-
ment proceedings. The conclusory justification advanced in favor of this excep-
tion is that on balance "the value of preserving confidentiality is outweighed by
the interest of society in gaining access to the protected communications.' '117
This legislative trend has been paralleled by judicial opinions holding the
privilege inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings even in the absence of
an express statutory exception. 8 To reach this conclusion these courts have
106 Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN.
BJ. 175 (1962).
107 Id. at 184. A similar exception is contained in the American Psychiatric Association's proposed Model
Law on Confidentiality of Health and Social Service Records, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 138, 140 (1979). See also CONN.
GEN. STAT. S 52-146f(b) (1977); A State Statute to Provide a Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 4 HARV. J. LEOSS.
307, 321 (1967).
108 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 223(2)(a) (1942) provides in part: "(2) There is no privilege under
Rule 221 as to any relevant communication between the patient and his physician (a) upon an issue of the
patient's condition in an action to commit him or otherwise place him under the control of another .... "
109 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 503(d)(1) (1974) provides in part: "There is no privilege under this rule
for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of
hospitalization."
110 FED. R. EVID. 504(D)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1973). The wording of this section is identical to rule
503(d)(1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, supra note 109.
111 ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 28-1001, Rule 503(d)(1) (1979).
112 CAL. EVID. CODE 5 1004 (West 1966). The recent decision of the Supreme Court of California in
Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20, articulated a
psychiatric duty to warn third persons of their patient's threats where the threats are likely to be carried out.
Although the patient's therapist in that case did not inform the intended victim of the threat, he did not
hesitate to reveal the patient's threats to the police so that the patient might be committed to a mental
hospital for observation.
113 FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 90.503(4)(a) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1979).
114 KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 60-427(c)(1) (1976).
115 ME. R. EVID. 503(e)(1) (Supp. 1978).
116 NEB. REV. STAT. 5 27-504(4)(a) (1975).
117 Goldstein & Katz, supra note 106, at 186. See also Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of
Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 635 (1964).
118 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 237 Mo. App. 464, 172 S.W.2d 269 (1943); In re Benson, 16
N.Y.S. 111 (1891). See In re Fleming, 196 Iowa 639, 641, 195 N.W. 242, 243 (1923). But see Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. at 1132 n.18; In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
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either engaged in attenuated theories of statutory construction' t9 or have stated
that the treating physician is best qualified, through his knowledge of the pa-
tient, to testify in such proceedings and, accordingly, have legislated an excep-
tion to the privilege.
20
Even in the event that information gleaned by the psychiatrist from a
therapy session with the patient would be valuable to the court in a commit-
ment proceeding, it should be recognized that the majority of commitments are
probably not preceded by such therapy sessions. 121 Courts are, therefore,
called upon in the majority of civil commitment proceedings to ascertain com-
mittability based upon short-term observation and evaluation along with the
public disclosures of the patient. If the information gleaned through the private
voluntary psychiatrist-patient relationship is considered to be a predicate to
commitment, the validity of the basis of the majority of commitment pro-
ceedings is necessarily flawed.
Even if such short-term observation is adequate, however, it should be
supplemented with additional psychiatric information when it is available.
Assuming that in a given case substantial additional information not available
from a nonprivileged source would be revealed, the benefit of disclosure in a
single case must be balanced against the perception of a broader class of
present or prospective patients who may not engage in therapy or candid
disclosures with their therapist based upon a fear of disclosure and subsequent
commitment. 1
22
The arguments in favor of revelation of confidences in commitment pro-
ceedings to protect society from the dangerous mentally ill, to protect the men-
tally ill from themselves, or to secure needed treatment must assume that com-
mitment will not occur in "appropriate' '1 23 cases in the absence of such
disclosures. The multitude of commitments not preceded by private voluntary
therapy between psychiatrist and patient tends to belie this assumption. And,
again, to the extent that commitment is avoided in an "appropriate" case
because of nondisclosure, the impact of this case must be balanced against the
broader impact that this perceived destruction of the privilege may have.
To the extent that nonrevelation may be thought to cause an error in the
failure to commit a potentially dangerous mentally ill person, the argument in
119 172 S.W.2d at 273.
120 16 N.Y.S. at 112.
121 The poor are said to suffer from a higher incidence of mental illness than the rest of our society.
B.BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 639 (1964). They are,
therefore, more likely to be subject to commitment proceedings. Because of the high cost of psychotherapy
such services have not generally been available to the poor either privately or through governmental pro-
grams. See A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958); Comment, Under-
privileged Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to the Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers,
61 CAL. L. REV. 1050 (1973). It is, therefore, not likely that the majority of commitments are preceded by
private psychotherapy. Moreover, it is conceivable that many of those persons who have manifested their
trust in the psychotherapist by maintenance of the relationship would accept the psychotherapist's recom-
mendation for in-patient care, thus avoiding the necessity of a commitment proceeding.
122 The argument in favor of the privilege must assume that the "broader class of present or prospective
patients" considers the possibility of compelled disclosure, knows the relevant aspects of the law of privilege,
correctly applies that law in the situation in which disclosure might be compelled, and chooses not to disclose
and receive appropriate care rather than risk the possibility of disclosure. In the absence of valid studies of
this aspect of human behavior, only unscientific hunches about the way people would behave in this situa-
tion are available to guide our judgment.




favor of disclosure fails to take into account certain critical realities. If we rely
upon psychiatric predictions of dangerousness to confine the dangerous men-
tally ill, then we must confront not only the literature canvassing available
studies which concludes that psychiatrists are inaccurate predictors of
dangerousness 124 but also the express disclaimer of the American Psychiatric
Association "that therapists, in the present state of the art, are unable reliably
to predict violent acts; their forecasts ... tend to overpredict violence, and in-
deed are more often wrong than right.' ' 25 Even if judicial use of these con-
fidences to predict future dangerousness was to be more reliable than
psychiatric predictions, the accuracy necessary to justify disclosure is extremely
high.1
26
The argument for rejection of the privilege in civil commitment pro-
ceedings rests, inter alia, upon the assumptions that without this witness'
testimony the patient will not secure -necessary treatment or will not be
prevented from engaging in dangerous behavior. For commitments based
upon this first assumption to be justified efficacious treatment must be
rendered after commitment. And, if commitments to prevent dangerousness
are not to result in permanent exclusion from society, efficacious treatment
should also be available for this class of commitments. However, the existing
evidence does not support a claim that those committed are effectively
treated.127 Thus, either as a vehicle for reducing dangerousness in society or
providing effective treatment to those thought to be in need of it, civil commit-
ment is a weak justification for gutting the privilege.
If efficacious treatment is to ever occur, it must be accompanied by patient
cooperation. 128 By definition, this is not present when the patient has rejected
treatment but is subjected to it by an order for involuntary commitment. Such
cooperation is more likely to occur, if at all, in voluntary treatment. If we wish
to foster beneficial treatment, which may have some impact on the reduction of
societal dangerousness, 129 where a private voluntary psychiatrist-patient rela-
124 Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence,
29 RuTGERs L. REv. 1084 (1976); Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment. A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways, 2 PSYCH. TODAY 43 (Feb. 1969); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 439 (1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
125 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
126 See Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75,
84 (1968):
Assume that one person out of a thousand will kill. Assume also that an exceptionally accurate test
is created which differentiates with ninety-five percent effectiveness those who will kill from those
who will not. If 100,000 people were tested, out of the 100 who would kill, 95 would be isolated.
Unfortunately, out of 99,900 who would not kill, 4,995 people would also be isolated as potential
killers. In these circumstances, it is clear that we could not justify incarcerating all 5,090 people.
If, in the criminal law, it is better that ten guilty men to go free than that one innocent man suffer,
how can we say in the civil commitment area that it is better that fifty-four harmless people be
incarcerated lest one dangerous man be free?
127 Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CAL. L. RE. 936, 947-48 (1974).
128 Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. COH. L. REv. 755, 768-69 (1969);
Wexler, Foreword: Mental Health Law and the Movement Towards Voluntary Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REv. 671
(1974).
129 Statistically, there is no reason to conclude that mentally ill persons as a class are more dangerous
than nonmentally ill persons. Diamond, supra note 124, at 448; Langsley & Barter, Community Mental Health
in California, 122 W.J. MED. 271, 272 (1976). Thus, commitment of the mentally ill as a vehicle for reducing
the number of dangerous persons in society is likely to have only a limited impact upon societal
dangerousness at best, for it operates only upon a distinct minority of those who might engage in such
behavior.
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tionship has preceded the institution of civil commitment proceedings, that
relation should be privileged. Absent an effective waiver of that privilege 30 the
psychiatrist should not be examined concerning confidential communications
made during the course of that relationship.
3 1
b. Examination
A situation to be contrasted to the first is where the psychiatrist is ap-
pointed by the court to examine the patient and inform the court of his
findings. The purpose of this relationship is not treatment and the patient is
therefore not encouraged to engage in disclosures which will, from his perspec-
tive, result in beneficial treatment. No serious dispute exists that the privilege
is inapplicable in this situation.132 One significant caveat must be advanced
here. Since the privilege is for the benefit of the patient, his reasonable belief
concerning the purpose of the relationship should control. 133 Accordingly,
where the purpose of the interview is other than treatment or diagnosis in con-
templation of immediate treatment the patient should be informed by the
psychiatrist at the outset of the interview of its purpose. 134 Failure of the
psychiatrist to announce this purpose could provide a basis to reject
automatically the psychiatrist's testimony 135 or to shift to the proponent of such
evidence the burden of proving that treatment could not reasonably have been
contemplated by the patient.1
36
c. Involuntary Treatment
Suppose the patient has been receiving involuntary treatment. The com-
mitment order has either expired' or the patient has exercised his right to seek
130 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 103.
131 411 F. Supp. at 1132 n.18; Orland, Evidence in Psychiatric Settings, 11 GONZAGA L. REV. 665, 679
(1976). Professor Orland points out that the delegation of authority to the psychotherapist to determine that
hospitalization is necessary in the proposed federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, thereby excepting the
privilege, is likely to destroy the relationship and not render damage to it unlikely. Id. at 678.
132 E.g., State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950).
133 See cases cited at note 99 supra. The application of this test could be problematic in the context of a
pre-commitment examination.
134 From the psychiatrist's perspective such a warning has been said to constitute an ethical obligation.
HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMA OF CRIME 329 (1967); J. McDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
CRIMINAL 40 (1958). See also Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1102 (1978).
135 See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 267, 311 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1974).
136 Where the exclusion of evidence on grounds of privilege is at issue, the person claiming the existence
of the privilege normally bears the burden of persuading the court of the existence of the privilege. United
States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1976). Shifting this burden where no warning was given
would be an appropriate vehicle to reflect a policy favoring clear communication in the purpose of the rela-
tionship. See Cleary, Presuming and Presumptions: An Essay on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959).
137 On legal and therapeutic grounds, commitments of finite duration appear to be required. D. WEx-
LER, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: ISSUES OF TREATMENT AND RELEASE 18-32
(1976); Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental Health in Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 674,
694 (1974). Presently, many states limit the duration of commitments and require subsequent judicial pro-
ceeding for further confinement. Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1383.
No doubt Justice Stewart's observation in O'Connor v. Donaldson, in the course of affirming Mr.
Donaldson's award of damages in a civil rights action, will prompt further attention to this issue: "Nor is it
enough that Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact
it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible it could not constitutionally
continue after that basis no longer existed." 422 U.S. at 574-75.
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judicial review of his commitment.13 8 In such situations, the psychiatrist's rela-
tionship with the patient is not exclusively for the purpose of treatment.
Because of the psychiatrist's role in the commitment process, therapeutic and
forensic contacts are intertwined. Should the psychiatrist be permitted to testify
over a timely objection on the grounds of psychotherapist-patient privilege?
If the privilege should not apply in the first situation involving voluntary
outpatient treatment prior to the institution of proceedings, then the present
situation does not call for application of the privilege. However, if the institu-
tion of commitment proceedings should not automatically result in loss of the
privilege, far more difficult questions are presented.
Those considerations which favor disclosure in this context are: (1) the
bulk of therapy in public mental institutions is delivered by persons whose rela-
tionship with the patient is not covered by a privilege; (2) if psychiatrist-patient
therapy is conducted, a court order for involuntary commitment and not a
pledge of confidentiality was responsible for thrusting the patient into this rela-
tionship; (3) whether or not a privilege is accorded, the involuntary patient is
not likely to make disclosures unless he thinks it will lead to his release; and (4)
whether or not a privilege is accorded, treatment of the involuntary patient is
not likely to be effective.
The considerations which favor confidentiality are: (1) confidentiality is
necessary for effective treatment, and (2) all institutional patients whether non-
paying or involuntary are entitled to effective treatment. Because the source of
the privilege is not a contractual relationship between the psychiatrist and pa-
tient but the desire to encourage confidentiality, 139 most courts which have ad-
dressed the application of the privilege to nonpaying residents of public mental
institutions have recognized that patients should not, for that reason alone, be
deprived of the privilege. 140 Similarly, if treatment for the involuntary patient
is contemplated, confidentiality would seem as important as for the voluntary
patient. 141
For the bulk of persons involuntarily committed to public mental institu-
tions, regular psychiatrist-patient therapy sessions do not exist. 142 Therapy ses-
138 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1383.
139 Linscott v. Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 361-64, 37 P.2d 26, 31-32 (1934); State v. Fontana, 277
Minn. 286, 288-89, 152 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1967).
140 E.g., Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955); State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 106, 471
P.2d 715, 718 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Linscott v. Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 361-64, 37
P.2d 26, 31-32 (1934); State v. Fontana, 277 Minn. 286, 288-89, 152 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1967); State v.
Sullivan, 373 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1962).
141 To the extent that confidentiality is the necessary lubricant for the closed mouth, those patients who
have not chosen therapy but who have had it chosen for them by the court would seem to require greater
lubrication to reveal information which could lead to a greater detriment-continued involuntary
hospitalization. This rationale seems to underlie the decisions in Taylor v. United States, and State v. Shaw.
142 In contrast with the previous representations of the psychiatric profession, "[p]resumably all of the
patients in any good mental hospital are receiving psychiatric treatment. This is true of persons whether
they are sent to St. Elizabeths Hospital as civil insane, as criminal insane or as 'sexual psychopaths.' " 222
F.2d at 401 (quoting Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital). An American
Bar Foundation Study of psychiatric hospitalization found active treatment being undertaken with no more
than "10 to 15 percent of the total patient population." R. RoCK, M. JACOBSON, & R. JANOPAUL,
HOSPITALIzArION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 70 (1968). Much of this is based upon the relatively
low numbers of psychiatrists on staff at such facilities. Of those psychiatrists present, a large percentage are
foreign medical graduates with "only a halting command of the language of their patients and an even dim-
mer understanding of the communities to which their patients will return." Chambers, Alternatives to Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1126
(1972).
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sions, if existent, are conducted by psychiatric social workers143 and other per-
sons to whom the privilege does not apply. 144 Thus, regardless of the utility of
such therapy, the patient ordinarily enjoys no privilege to prevent judicial
disclosures of the communication made in this relationship. The failure of an
effective psychiatrist-patient relationship cannot therefore be blamed upon the
absence of a privilege but, in the first instance, upon the absence of sufficient
numbers of psychiatrists in public institutions.
Proponents of the psychiatrist-patient privilege contend that the first pur-
pose of the privilege is to induce the patient to seek psychiatric care. t45 By
definition the involuntarily committed patient has rejected voluntary
psychiatric care. 146 Judicial compulsion and not a pledge of confidentiality led
to the patient's presence in the hospital. The involuntarily committed patient
would be present at the hospital whether or not a privilege existed.
The second purpose of the privilege is encouragement of candid
disclosures necessary for effective therapy. 147 The information currently
available seriously questions the efficacy of therapy currently available for the
civilly committed patient. 148 Accordingly, the second purpose to be served by
the privilege seems ill served in this context regardless of the privilege's ap-
plication.
The third purpose of the privilege is the development of patient trust.
49
The therapist must not pose a threat to the patient. Thus, from the beginnings
of contemporary psychotherapy, it has been suggested that a psychiatrist
should have no control over the patient. 5 0 Involuntary commitment is itself
143 Psychiatric social workers are the mainstay of the staffs of most public mental health facilities. Com-
ment, supra note 121. See also Slovenko, supra note 79, at 664.
144 Because the psychotherapist privilege statutes are usually drafted to include only psychiatrists or
psychologists, care rendered directly by psychiatric social workers, nurses, aides, and others is normally not
included with the privilege. Slovenko, supra note 79. The therapeutic session may also be conducted as a
group which lowers the per patient cost of service; however, the presence of the other patient-participants is
normally thought sufficient to defeat the privilege. Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants and
Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 191, 193-94.
145 17 Cal. 3d at 458-59, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting).
146 This generalization assumes that the patient is competent and that the hospital would accept the pa-
tient's application for voluntary admission if tendered. Restrictions on the use of guardianship proceedings
as an alternate route to hospitalization suggest that increasing numbers of committed patients will lack the
legal capacity to make application for voluntary admission. See, e.g., Pima County Pub. Fiduciary v.
Superior Court, 26 Ariz. App. 85, 546 P.2d 354 (1976). Additionally, in the case of the fickle patient who
wishes to be a voluntary patient one day and to leave the next, yet in the hospital's opinion requires treat-
ment and meets the standards for involuntary hospitalization, the hospital may opt to reject the voluntary
application and seek commitment.
147 17 Cal. 3d at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
148 Schwitzgebel, supra note 127, at 947-48:
In summary, the traditional forms of psychoanalytic psychotherapy as generally practiced in
public hospitals tend to show very limited effects upon behavior when patients are considered in
the aggregate .... The effectiveness of traditional therapies in changing the behaviors which led
to the commitment of the patients has yet to be clearly demonstrated. In a sense, these traditional
forms of therapy have been living for many years on public faith and "credit" while the public,
legislatures, and courts have acted in reliance upon statements of therapists which indicate that
treatment can in fact change behavior.
149 17 Cal. 3d at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
150 Plaut, supra note 93, at 1022:
The principle of the inverse relationship between confidentiality and authority was long ago
realized by psychoanalysts from another perspective. It was apparent in analysis that full
disclosure by the patient (via free association) was possible only if the analyst had no "authority"
over the patient's life . . ..
See also Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement for the Therapist: Technical Necessities for Absolute Privilege in
Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PsycH. 1093, 1094 (1974).
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antithetical to this tenet of effective psychotherapy. The psychiatrist's role in
recommending commitment or release and in testifying in court leads to pa-
tient perceptions of the institutional psychiatrist as a jailer, not a healer.151 So
long as involuntary commitment continues and the patient's psychiatrist par-
ticipates in that decision-making process patients are not likely to trust their
psychiatrist with any information except that which they believe will expedite
their release.'
5 2
Involuntary commitment is intertwined with the judicial process and, for
the present, the judicial role in this process is likely to increase rather than
decrease. Predictably hospitals to which patients are involuntarily committed
will be called upon with increasing frequency to justify continued involuntary
hospitalization. Given the predictability of this occurrence and the substantial
failure of the privilege's purpose in this context, the argument in favor of ap-
plying the privilege here is too weak to overcome the need for probative
evidence.
This conclusion is based upon the assumption of a single hospital unit
which examines, treats, and testifies. An alternative response is the use of
separate treating and examining teams within the hospital. This approach
would permit treating psychiatrists to approach their tasks without divided
loyalties. Their opinion concerning commitment would not be sought or ac-
cepted by the hospital. 53 The notes of their discussions with the patient could
be eliminated from the patient's chart.1 5 4 Once patients came to realize the
treating psychiatrists' role, candid disclosures might increase. And, the
arguments in favor of according a privileged status to this relationship would
be strengthened.
2. The Right to Privacy
The application of psychotherapist-patient privilege in the commitment
setting depends, in the first instance, upon the willingness of the legislature to
enact such a privilege.15 5 In the absence of such legislation, an alternative
source of the same protection may be an expansion of a constitutional right to
privacy. Proponents of this position contend that the constitutional protection
for the right to privacy found in the penumbras of the constitution and
recognized by the Court in such decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut156 and Roe v.
151 Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, 11 AM. CR. L. REv. 7, 19 (1972). See
also T. SzAsz, LAW, LmERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 230 (1963); Fleming & Maximov, supra note 93, at 1045-46.
152 Prettyman, supra note 151, at 28.
153 Because of the hospital's critical role in the recommitment or judicial review process, this change
could be accomplished by the hospital without the necessity of legislative action. Simply by arranging with
the prosecutor to call only the examining team psychiatrists, the hospital could circumvent the privilege
problems. Should legislative change be necessary because, for example, the prosecutor persists in issuing
subpoenas for the treating physicians, this separation of functions offers the legislature the opportunity to
encourage therapeutic relationships while still avoiding inappropriate release.
154 Although most courts conclude that the recordation of a privileged communication does not result in
the loss of its privileged status merely because it is placed in the patient's medical record, patient knowledge
of this enhanced degree of secrecy could lead to greater trust. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, § 2382, at 839
n.10.
155 See cases cited at note 76 supra.
156 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Wade' 57 is broad enough to include psychotherapist-patient relationships.15 8
Although the theoretical constructs for such an argument exist, 159 its judicial
reception has been lukewarm.
60
The argument in favor of the right to privacy protecting the
psychotherapist-patient relationship is strongest when the patient has consulted
the psychotherapist for treatment and commitment proceedings arise subse-
quently in which this psychotherapist's testimony is judicially compelled.
Unlike communication with an institutional psychiatrist after the inception of
commitment proceedings, it is reasonable to assume that the patient in the first
relationship does not expect disclosure. Such a compelled revelation of the pa-
tient's innermost thoughts results in governmental intrusion upon the patient's
ability to limit disclosure of his private affairs, and this is part of the meaning of
the right to privacy.'
6 1
Although the Supreme Court found that the relationship between a preg-
nant woman considering termination of her pregnancy and her physician fell
within the constitutional zone of privacy,1 62 it is clear that not all doctor-patient
relationships are included within this constitutional ambit. 63 Is the relation-
ship between the treating psychotherapist and his patient of the same or greater
importance than other private activities relating to marriage, 1
64 procreation, 65
contraception, 66 and abortion' 67 where the Court has previously grounded
limitations upon governmental intrusion? The questions which are brought to
the psychotherapist include problems arising out of these activities and may
bear directly on the quality or future existence of the patient's life. A convinc-
ing argument may therefore be advanced for protecting the communications
made within the relationship from compelled judicial disclosure.
However, even if this relationship is protected by a constitutional right to
privacy, the right will not be unqualified, 168 and its assertion in a particular
157 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
158 This argument was advanced in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp.
85, 88-89 (D. Conn. 1970); In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970); Bremer v.
State, 18 Md. App. 291, 307 A.2d 503 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974).
159 E.g., Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 935-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977). See Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 94-100 (1973); Louisell, supra note 71, at 110-11.
160 Felber v. Foote, 312 F. Supp. at 88-89; In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 839; Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. at 334, 307 A.2d at 529. The decision of the California
Supreme Court in Lifschutz acknowledged that the psychiatrist-patient privilege "has deeper roots than the
California statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage," but nonetheless concluded that
the state's interest in ascertaining the truth in litigation, particularly in the case of the patient-litigant,
outweighed whatever confidentiality may be constitutionally compelled. 2 Cal. 3d at 431, 467 P.2d at 567,
85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
Similarly, Justice Steven's opinion in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), upholding a New York law
which required state computer storage of physician prescriptions for certain classes of drugs, does not deny
that the physician-patient relationship may be of constitutional dimension. Rather it concludes that the New
York statutory scheme did not rise to a level of intrusion sufficient to establish an invasion of whatever
privacy interest may exist.
161 429 U.S. at 599.
162 410 U.S. 113.
163 429 U.S. 589.
164 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
165 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
166 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
167 410 U.S. 113.
168 Id. at 154.
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context must be balanced against the state interests implicated.169 In the com-
mitment hearing, the state's interests against which the right to privacy must
be balanced include protection of the public from the dangerous mentally ill,
protection of the mentally ill from self-inflicted harm, and beneficial treatment
for the proposed patient. Thus, to require the patient's therapist to testify over
a timely and specific objection it must be decided that these state interests are
sufficiently compelling 70 to justify denigration of the patient's privacy.
The analysis which should be undertaken to resolve this should focus first
on the compelling nature of the state's interest. Second, the analysis should
focus upon the necessity for the use of these psychotherapist-patient com-
munications to achieve the goals of the state. Assuming that the state's interests
in commitment are compelling,' 7' the question is whether judicial revelation of
these psychotherapist-patient communications is necessary for the state to be
successful in committing a person. If most commitments are not preceded by
psychotherapy, 72 then the use of information gleaned from psychotherapy can-
not be justified by a compelling state interest.
This same result does not follow where the relationship in question is with
an examining psychiatrist or institutional psychiatrist treating an involuntary
patient. In these relationships it cannot reasonably be concluded that privacy is
to be expected. Here the direct or indirect object of the relationship is ordinari-
ly disclosed so that the hospital or court may decide whether commitment is ap-
propriate.
3. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege or of a constitutional
right to privacy, another potential limitation on the use of psychotherapist-
patient communications in civil commitment proceedings is the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The argument in favor of applying the
privilege against self-incrimination in the commitment process recites that,
regardless of the civil label attached to such proceedings, commitment results
in a deprivation of liberty which should not be based upon the com-
pelled testimony of the prospective patient. 173 According to this argument the
use of evidence acquired through psychiatric or other staff interviews should
not be admissible in a civil commitment proceeding unless the patient has
waived the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The acceptance or rejection of this argument poses one of the most
troublesome problems in judicial scrutiny of civil commitment procedures. In
169 See, e.g., Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978), holding that the intrusion into the privacy
of patient records occasioned by the subpoena of such records by a state medical licensing board was per-
missible in light of the state's interest in investigating medical misconduct.
170 The recognition of a right to privacy reflects a judicial judgment that certain "fundamental rights"
are involved, thereby requiring the stricter degree of scrutiny of the compelling state interest test. 410 U.S.
at 153-56.
171 Although the Court has concluded that parenspatrie and police power commitments are legitimate
exercises of a state's powers, it has not yet addressed the question of whether such commitments advance a
compelling state interest. 99 S. Ct. 1804.
172 See note 121 supra.
173 Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations, 26
STAN. L. REv. 55, 79-80 (1973); Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1303; Legal Issues in State Mental
Health Care: Proposals for Change, supra note 1, at 101.
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addition to the conceptual legal problems posed by this question, the practical
consequences starkly define the issues. Application of the privilege may result
in the rejection of needed treatment. Conversely, denial of the privilege may
result in the evidence supporting a lengthy involuntary confinement flowing
exclusively from the prospective patient's compelled statements. Before prob-
ing more deeply into the constitutional supports for the arguments, an ap-
preciation of the complexity of this issue may be advanced by assuming that the
protection against self-incrimination is applicable and by examining its ap-
plication in the commitment process.
The privilege against self-incrimination is a limitation on the authority of
the sovereign and not on private citizens. 174 Thus a statement made to a
private psychiatrist prior to the institution of commitment proceedings would
be without the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination just as a
criminal defendant's admission of guilt to a private citizen not associated with a
law enforcement agency would be without the privilege. No governmental
compulsion is present in either case. The same absence of governmental com-
pulsion exists where the statements were made while the patient was a volun-
tary175 inpatient at a public or private176 psychiatric hospital. When the basis
for hospitalization becomes involuntary, the element of governmental compul-
sion enters into the equation.
At what point in time can the patient's status be considered sufficiently in-
voluntary to require consideration of the privilege? Arguably the application of
the privilege can be considered once a petition for involuntary commitment has
been filed, but can it be considered at any time before that? What, for example,
of the voluntary inpatient who is required to give twenty-four hours notice of
his intention to leave? 177 The recognition of a cause of action against such a
facility for the consequences of an inappropriate discharge
178 mandates that the
prudent hospital develop procedures to review the discharge. 1
79 If the patient is
examined at this time to evaluate the propriety of involuntary proceedings,
should the privilege apply? To the extent that deprivation of a criminal
suspect's freedom of action in some significant manner triggers application of
the privilege,180 the nature of the voluntary patient's confinement becomes in-
voluntary or custodial once the request for discharge has been made and not
174 E.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867-71 (2nd Cir. 1975); United States v. Bolden, 461
F.2d 998, 999 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 1969).
175 Where, however, voluntary hospitalization is, for example, plea bargained for dismissal of a petition
for involuntary hospitalization, the element of government compulsion increases. See also note 65 supra.
176 So long as the private psychiatric hospital detains patients involuntarily pursuant to state law, the
hospital's relationship with the patient is not merely determined on the basis of a private contract but also on
the basis of a public delegation of authority to the hospital to act as an agent of the state. To that extent the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to a patient involuntarily confined pursuant to a state
commitment statute in a private psychiatric hospital depends on the same considerations which apply in the
public facility.
177 See, e.g., ARIz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 36-519(B) (1974), which provides that a voluntary patient shall be
discharged within twenty-four hours of a request for discharge unless within that time proceedings for in-
voluntary commitment are authorized.
178 See, e.g., Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me.
214, 119 A. 577 (1923). But see Kravitz v. State, 8 Cal. App. 3d 301, 87 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970).
179 Conversely, the recognition of a cause of action for inappropriate confinement dictates that over-
prediction will not be judicially tolerated either. 422 U.S. at 574-75.
180 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). See also Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5




immediately satisfied. Accordingly, the privilege should apply here, if it is to
apply at all in the context of civil commitment. Similarly, the lack of freedom to
leave the hospital following an order for temporary hospitalization for an initial
examination prior to commitment or following an order of commitment would
call for application of the privilege against self-incrimination. Additional
analysis of the problem of which stages of the commitment process to which the
privilege should apply would similarly profit by analogy to the privilege's ap-
plication in the criminal process.
Assuming that the privilege against self-incrimination does apply during a
particular hospitalization, to what settings during the hospitalization is the
privilege and its concomitant requirement of a Warning applicable? Question-
ing of the patient by hospital staff on such matters as biographical data does
not, by analogy to the criminal law, invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. 8 1 However, certain distinctions in the scope of information
relevant to a prospective patient as compared with a criminal defendant's guilt
or innocence make this analogy problematic. A psychiatric patient's hostility
during an interview designed to glean biographical information may be inter-
preted as a manifestation of a particular mental illness. An inability to respond
to a question may be interpreted as an absence of orientation consistent with a
mental illness. Many things which seem logically unrelated to a diagnosis of
mental illness are considered to be important pieces of psychiatric data.
18 2
Unlike the scope of relevance in criminal proceedings, the potential in commit-
ment proceedings exists for virtually all information about the patient to bear
upon the patient's mental condition and therefore constitute the basis for com-
mitment. An examination may generate independent new evidence to support
the commitment in addition to whatever preceded the initial order for confine-
ment or observation. Thus it might be contended that whenever the involun-
tary patient's response to any staff questions constitutes a partial foundation'
83
for commitment, such evidence may not be received in the absence of a valid
waiver of the privilege.
This possibility is troubling for numerous reasons. At the time of the staff-
patient communication it may not be certain that a subsequent commitment
proceeding will occur and that the results of this conversation may be utilized
in support of commitment. If the staff member is to preserve the potential for
admissibility of the patient's statement, he must provide the necessary warning
in timely fashion. If we assume that patients are not ordinarily inclined to com-
municate information which they conclude may lead to continued confine-
ment, a warning preceding each interchange seems likely to sever communica-
181 United States ex rel. Hines v. Lavallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090
(1976). Note that where commitment is grounded upon the patient's inability to provide for his basic
necessities (ie., passive danger to self), questions concerning the patient's employment history, wages, or
residence could fall within the protection.
182 "All of the psychiatrists' professional education has been directed toward the development of a fluid,
amorphous, sentient comprehension of the inner life of his patient. Every tiny portion of information com-
municated to him becomes an integral part of this comprehension .... " Diamond & Louisell, The
Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 1335, 1351 (1965). See also
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 91, at 279.
183 Such statements may constitute a potential foundation for commitment where they are expressly
recited in the evidence or where they form part of the basis of an opinion of the patient's condition. See text
accompanying notes 309-30 infra.
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tions completely. Beyond this threshold problem three more exist: (1) the for-
mulation of an appropriate warning, (2) the difficulty of evaluating patient
waivers, and (3) the accessibility to proof when the privilege is not waived. The
privilege against self-incrimination is not a rule of competency beyond the
power of a party to waive but a right to refuse to give evidence which can be
waived. This requires that the existence of the privilege against self-
incrimination and the potential for its waiver be communicated to the patient.
What form should the warning take? Several possibilities exist: a formal
Miranda'84 warning, an informal warning ("Your responses to my questions
may be used at your commitment hearing.... "), or no set warning leaving the
precise communication to the skills of the staff member communicating with
the particular patient. If the similarity between criminal and civil commitment
proceeding is sufficient to compel application of the privilege against self-
incrimination, the patient's mental condition should bear upon waiver and not
upon the formulation of the necessary warning. Yet a patient's particular con-
dition may suggest that if the warning is to be understood it should be tailored
to his frame of reference. This would necessitate individualized warnings which
raises the problem of evaluating the sufficiency of the warning communicated
in each case.
More troublesome than the formulation of the warning is the evaluation of
purported waivers. The traditional "intentional relinquishment of a known
right"1 85 test for evaluating such waivers is likely to be difficult to apply in this
context. Although prior to commitment one might wish to assume competency
thereby justifying the acceptance of a patient's waiver at face value, 186 the very
purpose and nature of these proceedings question the logic of this
assumption. 187 Following a commitment, even in the absence of a specific
finding of incompetency, the acceptance of patient waivers can be accom-
plished with even lesser confidence. And, to confound matters further, if any
staff questioning which may lead to evidence upon which an order of commit-
ment is based necessitates a warning and waiver, precise gauges of competency
on a daily if not hourly basis may be required as a condition precedent to ad-
mission of such evidence.
The Lessard court's response to this problem is less than satisfactory. In a
footnote to a textual reference that a commitment may not rest upon a patient's
statements to the psychiatrist "in the absence of a showing that the statements
were made with 'knowledge' that the individual was not obliged to speak,' 188
the court noted:
We use the term knowledge advisedly. The presumption in a civil com-
mitment proceeding must be that the individual is indeed competent. If his
rights are explained to him in simple terms it may be presumed that he has the
requisite knowledge. If the individual in fact does not have this knowledge
because of a mental illness a subsequent finding of mental illness or mental in-
capacity on the basis of his statements cannot be said to violate due process.
184 384 U.S. 436.
185 Id. at 475; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
186 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1101 n.33.
187 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
188 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
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The state will still be obliged to prove that he is dangerous in order to sustain a
recommendation of commitment.8 9
The function which a "presumption of competence" or sanity plays in a civil
commitment proceeding is to require that the state satisfy its burden of persua-
sion based only upon the evidence adduced at the hearing pursuant to the rules
of evidence. This purpose is inapposite to the question of the competency of the
proposed patient to waive particular rights in such a proceeding where all
available information should be considered by the judge. 190 On such issues the
court should consider any prehearing psychiatric examinations. Particularly in
a jurisdiction in which prehearing examination reports indicating an absence of
the requisite degree of mental disorder would result in a dismissal of the pro-
ceedings without the necessity of a hearing, 191 the existence of the hearing itself
is cause for extremely stringent scrutiny of any purported waiver.
Perhaps it is the likelihood that few of such waivers could survive careful
scrutiny which then led the Lessard court into a fundamental mistake. The
fourth and fifth sentences of Lessard's footnote thirty-three envelop the exten-
sion of the privilege to civil commitment proceedings by concluding that
regardless of the patient's competence any purported waiver of the privilege is
constitutionally adequate. This approach is inadequate. If the privilege is ap-
plicable, in the absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege the
result of staff inquiries of the patient should not provide the foundation for an
order of commitment.
To consider further the impact of applying the privilege we must assume
that a patient refuses to waive the privilege. How will the state now seek to
prove that the proposed patient meets the statutory criteria for commitment?
The essential question in commitment proceedings is the proposed patient's
mental health, and the prime source of this information is the proposed patient.
Without an examination of this person it is highly questionable whether the
state can sustain its case if a rigorous standard of persuasion is applied.
The argument supporting application of the privilege in civil commitment
proceedings must rest upon the assumption that civil commitments are suffi-
ciently similar to criminal cases as to dispense with the civil labelt 92 or that
regardless of the fifth amendment, a similar limitation on governmental com-
pulsion is contained in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 193
The first argument relies heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in In re
Gault'94 which held that, notwithstanding the civil label, the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applied in juvenile proceedings. Disre-
garding labels, the Court focused upon the involuntary confinement resulting
from compelled statements. 195 By analogy, civil commitment of the mentally ill
189 Id. at n.33.
190 The validity of the purported waiver is a preliminary question concerning the admissibility of
evidence to be decided by the trial judge who is not bound by the rules of evidence, except as to matters of
privilege, in making this determination. FED. R. Evmv. 104(a).
191 Wexler & Scoville, supra note 15, at 63.
192 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1303.
193 Id.
194 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
195 Id.
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is also "incarceration against one's will."1 96 Accordingly, a strong argument
for application of the privilege against self-incrimination may be advanced on
this ground. A number of courts have found this argument persuasive and have
adopted the privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment on this
basis.
1 97
This response has not, however, been unanimous. The majority of
courts1 98 and commentators199 who have addressed this issue have rejected the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment pro-
ceedings. Some have simply adhered to the civil label attached to such com-
mitments and distinguished the privilege on that basis. 20 0 Although this ap-
proach appears inconsistent with the analysis required by Gault, there is reason
to question Gault's continued viability on this issue.
The reasoning used by Chief Justice Burger in deciding what standard of
persuasion should apply in civil commitment proceedings recites that "[i]n a
civil commitment state power is not excercised in a punitive sense. Unlike the
delinquency proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no
sense be equated to a criminal prosecution." ' 20 ' These statements are trou-
bling. In Gault, 202 the Court recognized that the state did not intend to punish
but to treat the juvenile. 20 3 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the potential
length of Gault's involuntary confinement-six years as a juvenile versus two
months, if he had been charged with the same act as an adult, 20 4 and the place
of that treatment-'"an institution of confinement ' 20 5 constituted a serious
deprivation of liberty. The court then reasoned that the constitutional protec-
tion against compelled testimony does not turn upon the labels applied to pro-
ceedings by the state but the consequences of the proceedings; in that case that
Court concluded that juvenile "commitment to a state institution, must be
regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination. "206
196 Id. at 50.
197 E.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. at 1130-32; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 394;
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1110. See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 250
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
In addition, by statute, several states now apply some formulation of the privilege against self-
incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. ALA. CODE § 22-52-9(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE
ANN. § 16-5006(4) (1978 Gum. Supp.); HAWAII REv. STAT. S 334-60(b)(4)(G) (1978); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. S 38-1304(4)(e) (1977 Cum. Supp.); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 5 5122.15(A)(12) (Page Supp. 1978); W.
VA. CODE § 27-5-4(c) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(6) (Supp. 1978).
198 Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1973); Tippett v. State of Md., 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 (4th
Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 355 (1972); French v.
Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793,
151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979); In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 488 (Fla. 1977); People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292,
248 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1969); State v. O'Neil, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109 (W. Va. 1974).
199 M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 91, at 285; Orland, supra note 131, at 686; Developments
in the Law, supra note 1, at 1312. But see Fielding, Compulsory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 117, 167 (1973); Note, Application of the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Civil Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L.J. 729.
200 In re Beverly, 342 So.2d at 488; State v. O'Neil, 274 Or. at 66, 545 P.2d at 104.
201 99 S. Ct. at 1810 (footnote omitted).
202 387 U.S. 1.
203 Id. at 15-16.
204 Id. at 29.
205 Id. at 27.
206 Id. at 49.
[October 1979]
EVIDENTIARY GUIDEPOSTS
The underlying act for which Addington was indefinitely committed,
assault by threat20 7 is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year in
jail plus a two-thousand-dollar fine. 208 Under the authority of the indefinite
commitment he may be confined for the rest of his life. His liberty will be
restrained regardless of the state's "civil labels and good intentions." Not only
does the potential deprivation vastly exceed that of Gault's but the likelihood of
successful treatment is insubstantial. The fact that Addington's three previous
hospitalizations did not obviate the need for further hospitalization, the implicit
conclusion that Addington's prognosis is not good, and the absence of evidence
that involuntary treatment is effective yield the conclusion that Addington may
be subject to a lifetime of custodial confinement. If Gault cannot be distin-
guished on this basis, Addington represents an erosion of Gault's analytical
model. With this erosion of Gault, the due process argument for application of
the privilege against self-incrimination is seriously undermined.
Other courts have seized upon the distinction between real and
testimonial evidence20 9 to reject the application of the privilege to psychiatric
examination. 210 These courts reason that a psychiatric interview yields real and
not testimonial evidence. Therefore they conclude that the privilege, which ob-
tains only to compelled testimony or communications is inapplicable. This
reasoning assumes that the disclosures made in a psychiatric interview are not
probative because of their content as assertions but only as a physical
characteristic indistinguishable from a fingerprint or blood sample. As a
ground for rejection of the privilege this analogy is shoddy. 211 Even if the per-
son examined does not admit the commission of a relevant act, his statements
describing his perception of the world around him will be considered by the
psychiatrist in evaluating his mental condition. Unlike the use of speech in a
lineup situation where the speech pattern may help to identify the declarant,
the patient's speech here is important primarily because of its content. The
speech pattern is itself important to the psychiatrist in civil commitment as an
aspect of the content of the speech. Thus the real and testimonial evidence
distinction is inadequate to support a rejection of the privilege in this context.
But another far more substantial hurdle exists in terms of the purposes of the
fifth amendment in criminal proceedings and the relevance of those purposes in
civil commitment proceedings. Among the many purposes sought to be served
207 99 S. Ct. at 1806.
208 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. tit. 3, 5 12.21 and tit. 5, 9 22.07 (Vernon 1974). Although the Court's cryptic
referent to "assault by threat" does not reveal the specific act, it is quite likely that the assault constituted a
class "C" misdemeanor which carries only a fine and no possible imprisonment. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. tit.
3, 5 12.23 (Vernon 1974).
209 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). In Schmerber the Court explained that a blood
sample belonged to a class of evidence categorized as real evidence. Because the court articulated a distinc-
tion in application of the privilege against self-incrimination to testimonial but not real evidence, the
privilege did not bar a compelled blood withdrawal and subsequent analysis. See also Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
210 E.g., United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d
700, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 9, 210 A.2d 763, 771 (1965).
211 "[T]he focus of the mental examination is not to invoke evidence of behavior, per se. Rather the ob-
jective is to learn about the individual's mental condition." Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals
for Change, supra note 1, at 101. Seealso Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Aronson,
supra note 173, at 67-69; Note, Miranda on the Couch: An Approach to the Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to
Counsel, and Miranda Warnings in Pre-Trial, Psychiatric Examination of Criminal Defendants, 11 COLUM. J.L. &
SoC. PROB. 403, 429-31 (1975).
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by the privilege against self-incrimination, 2 12 one of the most significant is the
relationship it seeks to describe between the state and individual:
We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination-the
essential mainstay of our adversary system-is founded on a complex of
values, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57, n. 5 (1964); Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-415, n. 12 (1966). All these policies point to one over-
riding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and in-
tegrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to re-
quire the government "to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence
317 (McNaughton rev. 1961), to respect the inviolability of the human per-
sonality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the govern-
ment seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of com-
pelling it from his own mouth. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-238
(1940). In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the
right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
213
Implicit in the notion that the government "shoulder the entire load" is the
assumption that in the class of cases to which the privilege applies, it is possible
for the government to do this and still prevail in appropriate cases. 214 Evidence
other than information from the accused must be sufficient to support a verdict
for the government. This is true, at least theoretically, 21 5 in criminal cases.
In civil commitment proceedings it is necessary for the government to
show that the proposed patient is mentally ill and in need of treatment or men-
tally ill and dangerous to himself or others. 21 6 What will permit the government
to demonstrate independently the mental illness of the proposed patient?
Although descriptions of the patient's behavior and uncompelled statements
will shed light on his mental process, the exclusive use of this kind of evidence
will ordinarily result in an ambiguous suggestion of the patient's thought pro-
cess. 21 7 If the evidence is rigorously scrutinized, evidence of the patient's
behavior alone may not suffice to permit a finding of mental illness. Perhaps
patient cooperation is required for a reliable diagnosis.
21 8
In light of this critical distinction between criminal and civil commitment
212 8J. WIGrMORE, supra note 72, § 2251, at 310-18. Wigmore lists twelve different policies which have
been utilized tojustify the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that the number ofjustifications
advanced is a function of a flexible privilege which is not the same in different contexts. Id. at 296.
213 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 460.
214 Although one may theorize the perfect crime for which a successful prosecution cannot be main-
tained because of the absence of any evidentiary loose ends, we assume that this degree of perfection will not
be attained with any substantial frequency. Where this occurs, the failure of conviction without compelled
testimony is an unavoidable cost of maintaining the desired balance.
215 384 U.S. 436.
216 Developments in the Law, note 1 supra, at 1201-07.
217 Our civil commitment laws do not seek to commit people who are dangerous; rather, they seek to
commit the mentally ill. The failure to permit psychiatric examinations of the patient may result in an ex-
pansion of the concept of mental illness in civil commitment to include all seemingly irrational behavior. See
Powell v. State, 579 F.2d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 1978).
218 Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1973); French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1358
(M.D.N.C. 1977); State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976); Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126
(W. Va. 1974); Krash, The Durham Rule andJudicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Colum-




proceedings the argument for application of the fifth amendment is seriously
undermined. If a rigorous standard of persuasion is to be applied, can any case
lacking psychiatric testimony based upon a personal interview of the patient
survive a motion for a directed verdict?
2 19
In the absence of a limitation on compelled testimony derived directly
from the fifth amendment a pragmatic analysis undertaken under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment may yield a similar limitation. 220 The
analysis which proceeds under the due process clause entails a balancing of the
interests protected by the privilege against the costs of its application. The costs
of applying the privilege include the strong possibility of an inability to commit
where the privilege is not waived, thereby leading to a virtual destruction of the
commitment process. 221 Thus, only if the interests protected by the privilege
222
in this context outweigh the desirability of permitting civil commitment can in-
vocation of the privilege be permitted.
Certain compromise solutions have been advocated. The proposal of the
Mental Health Law Project is the most innovative. The Mental Health Law
Project's Legislative Guide223 proposes that the privilege against self-
incrimination apply in commitment proceedings and that the burden of per-
suasion224 to the proposed patient on certain issues if the privilege is invoked.
The difficulty with this creative response to the problem is that it stilldeprives
the state of access to evidence~which is not available elsewhere and may be
necessary if the state is to sustain its burden of persuasion. If the proposed pa-
tient satisfies his burden of production on these issues by presenting the
testimony of his psychiatrist, the state still lacks access to the probative
evidence it will need to succeed. It may cross-examine the patient's witnesses
yet it still may not compel a psychiatric examination of the patient himself.
Moreover, the constitutionality of imposing the burden of persuasion on the
proposed patient as a consequence of exercising a constitutional right raises
other constitutional problems.
225
Other proposed solutions to the problem of compelled patient disclosures
219 This prophecy of doom of course ignores the fact that in a number of jurisdictions the privilege
against self-incrimination now applies to commitment proceedings and these proceedings have not been
substantially impeded. Whether the explanation for this is a loose analysis of waiver, insubstantial scrutiny
of evidence through a very low standard of persuasion, or a failure of the author's argument requires field
study. It is fair to suggest at this juncture, however, that the initial impact of tightening in one area has been
a loosening, albeit unauthorized, in another area. See Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin, The Impact of
Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 503, 517, suggesting that patient invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in Wisconsin following Lessard has led to judicial fudging of the standard
of persuasion.
220 Developments in the Law, supra note 1, at 1306.
221 See note 218 supra.
222 8J. WIOMORE, supra note 72, § 2251, at 310-318.
223 Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, supra note 1, at 139-40.
224 The notion of shifting evidentiary burdens based upon one party's better access to the evidence is not
unique to the Mental Health Law Project's proposal. Professor Cleary suggests that access to proof is one of
the most significant factors in allocating evidentiary burdens. Cleary, supra note 136, at 12. Ordinarily,
however, although one party may enjoy better access, the other party is not absolutely denied such access.
The Project's proposal would absolutely deny access to evidence of the patient's condition through a com-
pelled psychiatric interview.
225 Unlike Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), where the Court found constitutional the
allocation of insanity questions as an affirmative defense to which the accused was assigned the burden of
persuasion, the Project's proposal would assign the patient the responsibility of proving an aspect of sanity,
one of the core issues in the proceeding, without any evidentiary showing by the state. Moreover, the
shifting may be an impermissible punishment for the exercise of a constitutional right. Suzuki v. Alba, 438
F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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would permit defense counsel or psychiatrists to be present at the psychiatric
interview. 226 Even if the presence of these third parties is not disruptive in this
situation as many have surmised, 227 this approach assumes that the
psychiatrist's opinion will be gleaned from one or more isolated interviews with
the patient. It is far more likely that numerous planned and unplanned patient
contacts with aides, nurses, and medical staff will provide the support for a
considered opinion. Although defense counsel or psychiatrist might make the
logistical arrangements to be presented at a single examination, it is not likely
that either will wish to be the patient's full-time companion in the hospital in
order to be present during all of these contacts.
4. Psychiatric Expertise
Psychiatrists testifying in civil commitment proceedings often couch their
testimony in the "buzz words" of the relevant statute reciting simply that the
prospective patient is mentally ill and dangerous or mentally ill and in need of
treatment. 228 The evidentiary predicate229 to the admission of such testimony is
an analysis of whether expert testimony is admissible on these issues, whether
the witness qualifies as a expert and whether this form of testimony should be
accepted.
The test for expert testimony on a particular question is whether such
testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence." 230 To make
this preliminary determination the judge must decide whether mental illness,
its treatment, and the consequences of failure to treat it are matters of such
common knowledge that a juror would not be assisted by expert testimony.
The response to this question has been that these issues are not a matter of
common knowledge and thus expert opinion may be received.2 3' The conclu-
sion that the average lay juror is not clairvoyant in matters of mental illness is
reasonable. It seems fair to say that most lay individuals lack a thorough
understanding of the workings of the human mind. The more troubling ques-
tion is whether at the present state of the art psychiatrists as a class have the
requisite knowledge to be truly classified as expert witnesses in matters of men-
tal illness.
Jay Ziskin, a lawyer and a psychologist, has listed numerous deficiencies
226 Aronson, supra note 173, at 90-92.
227 E.g., United States v. Albright, 338 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1968).
228 Wexler & Scoville, supra note 15, at 64-65; Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposalsfor Change,
supra note 1, at 105.
229 Predicate is used here to describe the analytical hurdles which the admission of such testimony must
survive in the face of a timely and specific objection. Other predicates to the admission of such evidence exist
in addition to those described in the text. These include such matters as materiality and relevancy, but these
matters are not unique to expert testimony and are not discussed herein.
230 FED. R. Evio. 702. The modern trend exemplified by the Federal Rules of Evidence is to permit ex-
pert testimony on matters not wholly beyond the ken of the averagejuror if such testimony would be helpful
in understanding the evidence. Lofton v. Agee, 303 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1962); Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill.
2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965). See also S. SALTZBURG & R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
413 (2d ed. 1977).
231 Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 419 (1952). A quotation from a recent Fifth Circuit
decision in a civil commitment case is illustrative of the judicial response to these questions. "The first
criterion, that the person is mentally ill, is strictly a medical judgment that the judge can render only with
the assistance of expert medical knowledge. This requirement is to assure that only the truly mentally ill are
hospitalized." Powell v. State of Fla., 579 F.2d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 1978).
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in contemporary psychiatry which he contends should bar the admission of
psychiatric expert testimony. 232 The barrage leveled by Ziskin includes charges
that psychiatry is not an established science but rather a hodgepodge of con-
flicting and unproven theories 233 and that psychiatric evaluations lack reliabili-
ty and validity. 234 If we accept these claims, does it follow that psychiatric ex-
pert testimony should be barred?
The critical function of the expert witness lies not in his recitation of facts
observed but rather in "a power to draw inferences from the facts which ajury
would not be competent to draw.''235 To draw these inferences the expert
utilizes a reasoning process which he has independently discovered or learned
through the teachings of others. If this processing of information by the expert
is based upon a premise we think to be wholly erroneous (i.e., that the earth is
the center of the universe or one plus one is three), then the inferences drawn
by the expert will confuse and not enlighten. As a jury protection device,
minimum threshold tests for scrutinizing the assumptions which underlie the
expert's opinion have evolved:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
236
Is psychiatry 237 sufficiently established, has it passed from the experimental to
the demonstrable stage?
Perhaps not if one accepts Ziskin's 23 8 claims. Yet without much furor,
courts have routinely accepted psychiatric expert testimony239 and legislatures
have frequently demanded it.240 Even where the psychiatric profession has
itself denied its expertise on a particular issue such as the prediction of
232 J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 193-204 (1978).
233 Id. at 195-96.
234 Id. at 198-99. Ziskin compares psychiatric diagnosis which studies have shown to be wrong as often
as right; with polygraph examinations which studies have shown to have a higher reliability and validity but
have, with rare exception, been denied admission in the face of an objection. SeeJ. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH
AND DECEPTION 237 (1966).
235 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, 9 13, at 29.
236 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d
431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
237 Psychiatrists hold no irrefutable monopoly on expert witness status on such issues. For example,
clinical psychologists may also be accorded the same status. Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
238 Ziskin is not the only commentator who rejects the contention that psychiatrists satisfy the criteria for
expert witness status. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 124, at 736. In a more subtle tone, Justice Frankfurter
observed, "The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy re-
garding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment .... Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366, 37 (1956).
239 See note 231 supra. The admissibility of expert testimony, particularly under FED. R. Evso. 702, is left
largely to the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Lopez, 543 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
240 S. BRAXEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 50 (rev. ed. 1971).
[Vol. 55:53]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER




The reversal of this trend seems unlikely in the near future in the absence
of virtually unimpeachable proof supporting another theory to explain human
behavior. Regardless of the protestations of psychiatrists or their critics, the
judicially felt need for some authority to explain aberrant behavior is not likely
to lead courts to abandon one school of thought in exchange for a vacuum. And
in light of contemporary evidentiary trends away from jury protectiveness, ad-
mission of such evidence is perhaps appropriate leaving the jury to evaluate its
validity 242 against a Ziskin-type challenge.
Given the desirability or the inevitability of psychiatric expert testimony
the next issue is the form which such testimony may take. The form of
testimony is one of the essential differences between the testimony of an expert
and a nonexpert witness. The nonexpert witness' value in judicial proceedings
is the presentation to the judge or jury of the facts which this witness has
perceived relevant to the event at issue. Thus the nonexpert witness may be
restricted to a factual narration of his perceptions.2 43 Although the expert may
also testify as to facts perceived, his unique function lies in drawing inferences
or reaching opinions from these facts.2 44 Thus experts have traditionally been
permitted to testify in the form of an opinion or conclusion.2 45 Where,
however, the psychiatrist's opinion or conclusion in a commitment proceeding
merely recites the ultimate criteria for commitment, 246 some fear that the
decision-making function is virtually transferred to the psychiatrist.
247
It is this same feared usurpation of thd judge or jury's function which
previously led to the exclusion of opinions on ultimate issues in the litigation. 248
The modern trend in evidence law, however, rejects this ultimate issue limita-
tion upon opinion evidence. 249 The basis for the contemporary rejection of this
ultimate issue limitation includes the often illusory difference between ultimate
and nonultimate facts or issues, frequent inability of the witness to articulate
testimony in another form, and the fact-finder's freedom to disregard the ex-
pert's testimony.
25 0
Rejection of the ultimate issue rule does not, however, lead automatically
241 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 4.
242 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, 5 203, at 491; WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, 702[011, at 702-09.
243 Courts have understandably found it difficult to distinguish between facts and opinions, and lay
witnesses have experienced difficulty in couching their testimony in only the former. Ladd, supra note 231,
at 414-15. Indeed the difference between fact and opinion is but one of degree. A recognition of this blurred
distinction has resulted in a gradual relaxation of the restriction upon lay opinion testimony. One such ex-
ception has generally permitted a witness who observed a person to testify as to his sanity. See, e.g., Connec-
ticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 620 (1884).
Similarly, in civil commitment proceedings the lay witness' use of such terms as sane or insane should
not result in the exclusion of the testimony, if it is based upon the firsthand perception of the witness and is
otherwise helpful in resolving disputed issues. FED. R. EvID. 701.
244 C. McCormick, supra note 97, § 13, at 29.
245 Id.
246 For example, Attorney: "Doctor, would you give us your findings?" Psychiatrist: "He is suffering
from a major psychiatric illness and may be dangerous to himself and others." Wexler & Scoville, supra note
15, at 41.
247 Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, supra note 1, at 105.
248 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 72, 5 1920, at 17 (1940).
249 E.g., FED. R. EvIn. 704, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 284 (1973).
250 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 12, at 27-28.
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to acceptance of such conclusory testimony. 25I The key to the admission of ex-
pert testimony is helpfulness to the judge or jury. 25 2 Testimony merely reciting
the statutory "buzz words" or that the proposed patient is "committable"
would lack the requisite helpfulness. Moreover, the use of unexplained
psychiatric jargon similarly fails to assist the fact finder.
A diagnosis of the defendant's condition, while involving conclusions of a
kind, is admissible even though a jury is not bound by a diagnosis or a par-
ticular diagnostic label on a mental disorder. The jury wants and needs help
from the expert, but it does not help a jury of laymen to be told of a diagnosis
limited to the esoteric and swiftly changing vocabulary of psychiatry. Every
technical description ought to be "translated" in terms of "what I mean by
this," followed by a down-to-earth concrete explanation in terms which con-
vey meaning to laymen. A psychiatrist who gives ajury a diagnosis, for exam-
ple, of "psychoneurotic reaction, obsessive compulsive type" and fails to ex-
plain fully what this means, would contribute more to society if he were per-
mitted to stay at his hospital post taking care of patients.
25'
Where the psychiatrist does not himself translate these conclusions into a
down-to-earth explanation, the attorney examining or cross-examining the
witness should require the witness to translate his testimony into intelligible
and meaningful terms.
254
Although it might normally be expected that counsel functioning within
our adversary system would require such a translation, this expectation has not
always come to fruition in civil commitment proceedings. 255 Where the system
breaks down the trial judge should assume the responsibility for prodding
counsel into a more probing examination of the witness 25 6 or condition the ad-
missibility of such testimony upon a disclosure of the underlying material upon
which the opinion is based and the process by which the expert reasons from
this material to his conclusion.
2 57
In response to these problems the Mental Health Legislature Guide ad-
vocates a blanket restriction upon opinions as to certain diagnostic
categories. 258 Rather than imposing a blanket restriction on particular
diagnostic terminology and thereby risking exclusion of probative evidence,
direct or cross-examination of the witness proffering these labels is preferable to
exclusion. Where the psychiatrist refuses to provide a meaningful translation of
these terms exclusion might then be justified.
251 Id.
252 FED. R. EVID. 702.
253 Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J., dissenting). See also
Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
254 307 F.2d at 615.
255 Wexler & Scoville, supra note 15, at 51-60.
256 307 F.2d at 615. See also 390 F.2d at 454 n.30.
257 252 F.2d at 617. See also FED. R. EVID. 705.
258 Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, supra note 1, at 105. The diagnostic
categories referred to in the guide are schizophrenic and manic depressive illness. The guide's exclusion of
these labels is based upon the guide's conclusion that such labels misrepresent the actual condition of the
proposed patient, are the product of demonstrably unreliable diagnosis, and can be substituted with more
meaningful descriptive information. Id.
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5. The Basis of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony
The expert's critical function, noted previously, 59 is drawing inferences
from facts. How does the expert learn of these facts to which he applies his
reasoning skills? If the expert is a psychiatrist he may have examined the pa-
tient himself, he may have been present in the courtroom to hear the testimony
of witnesses who observed the patient or have this testimony communicated to
him in a hypothetical question, or he may have gained this information from
other sources outside the courtroom. 260 These categories of informational
predicates to expert opinion are typically referred to as the bases of expert opin-
ion. 261 Where the psychiatrist's opinion is based upon a personal examination
of the patient or judicial testimony no absolute barrier to the receipt of his opin-
ion has been erected;2 62 however, because the third class of bases raises signifi-
cant hearsay problems, its evidentiary reception has been mixed. 263 The use of
this category of information in civil commitment proceedings is a particularly
important question because, more than other physicians, the psychiatrist relies
upon a variety of out-of-court sources in formulating his opinions.
264
a. Hearsay Problems
Hearsay "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." 265 The psychiatrist testifying in court will frequently include as the
bases for his opinion statements of the patient's friends or relatives, observa-
tions and opinions of other professionals, or the results of specific tests per-
formed upon the patient. Where this information upon which the psychiatrist
bases his opinion has not been independently introduced into evidence, a hear-
say problem arises. 266 Although it has been maintained that reliance upon
these bases is not proscribed by the hearsay rule because the out-of-court
statements are not admitted for their truth,267 that rationale for accepting those
bases for the expert's opinion is unsound. When a psychiatrist opines, for ex-
ample, that the prospective patient's aberrant behavior is not the result of a
physiological disfunction, he relies not upon the mere fact that certain tests
were performed and results reported but upon the veracity of the test results.
When the patient's neighbor describes finding the patient sitting naked in his
driveway with a rifle in hand, this statement is considered by the psychiatrist
and incorporated into this ultimate opinion if the psychiatrist believes it to be
259 See note 230 supra.
260 Rheingold, supra note 64, at 489. See also Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basisfor Expert Opinion,
5 VAND. L. REv. 432 (1952).
261 Rheingold, supra note 64, at 989.
262 See FED. R. EvID. 703, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283 (1973).
263 See Maguire & Hahesy, supra note 260; Rheingold, supra note 64; Comment, The Admissibility of Expert
Medical Testimony Based in Part upon Information Received from Third Persons, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 193 (1962).
264 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 182, at 1350.
265 FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
266 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 182, at 1350.
267 Seidel & Gingrich, Hearsay Objections to Expert Opinion Testimony and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
39 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 141, 144 (1970).
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true and not simply because it was made. 268 The psychiatrist's opinion is a pro-
fessional translation of these events in which he communicates the meaning of
these events to the judge or jury. Accordingly, only if there is evidence of
trustworthiness in these out-of-court statements sufficient to override the con-
cerns of the hearsay rule269 should such statements be the permissible bases of
opinion testimony.
The contention that the requisite indicia of trustworthiness is found in
such statements has been supported on a variety of grounds: because of the ex-
pert witness' skill he will scrutinize and thereby validate the hearsay he uses;
270
where the evidence is derived from technicians or other skilled persons it may
on this basis be especially reliable because of its source; 27' the use of such
evidence is often a matter of practical necessity; 27 2 or in any event, the expert's
conclusions are sufficiently supported by nonhearsay. 273 Following this reason-
ing the trefid in evidence law, reflected in rule 703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is to permit the expert to rely upon the type of facts or data which is
"reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject.' '274 As applied to medical testimony
this result is sound because hearsay pervades all medical testimony. 275 Even if a
psychiatrist formulates an opinion based solely upon her observation of the pa-
tient, her opinion will incorporate the statements of her medical school
teachers, authors of medical texts and articles she has read, and what she has
learned in practice. 276 Thus a rigid approach designed to rid medical testimony
of any taint of hearsay would effectively rid the courts of medical testimony.
The federal rule wisely rejects an all-or-nothing approach to such potentially
valuable testimony and instead scrutinizes the reasonableness of utilizing a
particular source. No cogent reason exists to vary this approach when applied
to civil commitment proceedings.
Although scrutiny under such a commonplace legal standard should not
268 See Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testimony: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S.
CAL. L. REv. 129, 145-46 (1977); Comment, The Physician's Testimony-Hearsay Evidence or Expert Opinion: A
Question of Professional Competence, 53 TEx. L. REv. 206, 297 (1975).
269 In order to evaluate a witness' testimony, four critical items must be examined-the witness' original
perception of the event, his recollection of that event from the initial perception to the time of narration, his
ultimate narration of the event to the fact-finder, and his sincerity. An examination of these critical phases is
probably adequate where the narrating witness testifies under oath, in the presence of the fact-finder who
may observe his demeanor, and subject to cross-examination. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, § 245, at 581.
See also Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
270 "As has been repeatedly pointed out, the expert is competent to ascertain the reliability of statements
and reports of others and to use only what is relevant and trustworthy. The concept, simply put, is that the
doctor validates what he uses." Rheingold, supra note 64, at 532. This argument is bolstered by the conten-
tion that the physician is called upon in his daily practice to evaluate the reliability of this information in
making life and death decisions about his patients. Id. at 531.
271 Maguire & Hahesy, supra note 260, at 435-36.
272 In psychiatry the past medical and social history of the patient is of prime importance. A
psychiatrist hesitates to make a diagnosis without the illumination afforded by what he calls a
"longitudinal study of behavior." But he often learns the history of the patient's aberrant
behavior only at second or third hand from friends or relatives, perhaps through a psychiatric
social worker. Where the law forbids the psychiatrist to rest his diagnosis on such hearsay
material, it requires him to base his diagnosis on what from the scientific viewpoint are incomplete
data-or run the risk of having his entire testimony thrown out.
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 91, at 221.
273 Maguire & Hahesy, supra note 260, at 435.
274 FED. R. Evwo. 703.
275 Rheingold, supra note 64, at 527.
276 Id. at 473. See also Diamond & Louisell, supra note 182, at 1351-53.
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be expected to be difficult, preliminary experience with rule 703 is cause for
concern. Rather than scrutinizing the reasonableness of expert's use of such
evidence, courts have all too frequently interpreted rule 703 as only requiring
customary reliance by the experts which violates the express language and pur-
pose of the rule. 277 A group's pattern of behavior should not conclusively
establish its reasonableness. 278 Merely because a class of experts utilizes a cer-
tain category of information in formulating opinions does not, ipsofacto, render
the use of that information reasonable. Rather this group conduct is simply one
of the factors to be considered in determining reasonableness. The court must
independently scrutinize the expert's 279 use of such out-of-court sources for the
consequence of their use may be denial of effective cross-examination of the
declarant. Conceivably, such scrutiny could entail testimony from other
psychiatrists and academicians, medical texts or field studies contained in the
literature, all screened through the common sense of the judge.
2 8 0
Two distinct questions remain-should we now seek to erect a set of rigid
rules defining permissible bases and what should be the remedy for considera-
tion of an impermissible basis? It is premature at this juncture to cast a firm set
of rules defining those circumstances in which a psychiatrist might reasonably
use extra-judicial sources of information as the basis for an in-court opinion.
Instead case-by-case scrutiny is appropriate until predictable patterns emerge
and the justifications and challenges to various bases have been examined.
However, as an illustration of the approach which might be followed on par-
ticular issues consider the following. If it appears that psychiatrists base their
prediction of the patient's future dangerousness upon incidents of patient
violence observed by another staff member and recorded in the patient's
chart,the following question might be raised-is it reasonable for a psychiatrist to
base a prediction of dangerousness upon an event observed by another staff
member when the psychiatrist has not consulted other informational sources,
including the patient, concerning the alleged incident? In favor of the
reasonableness of exclusively using such a report it might be argued that
hospital staff members are professionals trained to report events objectively
and any questions of their objectivity go to the weight and not the use of the
report as a basis for opinion. In addition, the time expended by the staff's
judicial testimony or oral discussion will add costs not justified by the enhanced
reliability of the expert's opinion. Conversely, it may be maintained that
anyone's perceptions of an event such as a fight, are extremely subjective and
without independent verification by the psychiatrist, a prediction of
dangerousness may be mistakenly based upon an act of self-defense which
should not be considered dangerousness cognizable under civil commitment
277 Note, supra note 268, at 144.
278 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 470 (1903); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d
Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
279 Judicial scrutiny can occur only if the expert recites the basis for his opinion. Thus, many states have
made such a recital a predicate to receipt of the expert's opinion. Rheingold, supra note 64, at 475-76. The
trend reflected by rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not to condition receipt of the testimony upon
"disclosure of the underlying facts or data," leaving the choice of forcing disclosure to the cross-examiner.
Whether extension of this rule to commitment is appropriate in light of the documented inadequacies in
zealous patient representation is problematic.
280 This determination is a preliminary question concerning the admissibility of evidence which must be
decided by the court. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 829-30 (Me. 1978).
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laws. 281 Such a subjective source should be cross-checked or its use, it can be
argued, is unreasonable. Before ruling on this question the court might ask
counsel to present any studies which exist addressing the accuracy of narration
of this class of persons.
282
When the court rules that reliance upon a particular source of information
utilized by the psychiatrist was not reasonable, will it be sufficient to ask the ex-
pert to reconsider her opinion in the absence of such data or will rejection of the
entire opinion be necessary? The resolution of this question turns upon the
court's confidence in the ability of the psychiatrist to engage in the mental gym-
nastics necessary to excise the impermissible basis from the permissible basis
which supports her opinion and upon the psychiatrist in fact doing this. Unlike
the suppression of an unlawful confession where the court can independently
examine the informational chain leading to the alleged untainted sources of
that same information, 283 here the chain leading from bases to opinion is ex-
clusively within the psychiatrist's mind and therefore realistically susceptible to
far more limited judicial scrutiny.
b. Confrontation Problems
Merely because the extra-judicial bases for expert testimony survive
scrutiny on hearsay grounds does not end the necessary inquiry into their per-
missible use. The Supreme Court has stated in a series of recent opinions that
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the hearsay rule are not
synonymous. 284 Although the hearsay rule and confrontation clause are based
upon similar considerations, evidence proscribed by the confrontation clause
may survive scrutiny under the hearsay rule285 and, conversely, evidence
which survives scrutiny under the confrontation clause may be proscribed by
the hearsay rule. 28 6 Therefore the extra-judicial bases of expert testimony in
civil commitment proceedings must be subjected to independent scrutiny
under the confrontation clause.
287
Those courts which have not barred the use of extra-judicial bases for ex-
pert opinion under the hearsay rule have also found no difficulties raised under
the confrontation clause by the use of this evidence in criminal cases .288 The
281 Shuman, Hegland, & Wexler, Arizona Mental Health Services Act: An Overview and an Analysis of Proposed
Amendments, 19 ARiz. L. Rav. 313, 330 (1977).
282 See, e.g., studies described in Steward, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. Rav. 1.
283 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
284 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
285 390 U.S. 719; 380 U.S. 400.
286 399 U.S. 149.
287 Although the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is only expressly applicable in criminal
prosecutions, numerous courts have found the confrontation requirement necessitated in civil commitment
proceedings under this amendment or as an element of due process. Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 973
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. at 1130; Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. at 517.
See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
288 E.g., United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 764 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Ward, 61 111. 2d 559,
566-68, 338 N.E.2d 171, 176-77 (1975). But see United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972), where the court of appeals acknowledged, in scrutinizing an expert witness
testimony in a criminal proceeding based upon out-of-court conversations and corporate documents not in
evidence concerning the value of property, that separate hearsay and confrontation questions arise. 447
F.2d at 1287. Thereafter, the court's analysis fell flat when it relied upon California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), which permitted a prior inconsistent statement exception to the confrontation requirement because
the declarant in fact was present and available for cross-examination to sidestep the confrontation problems.
In Green the out-of-court statements at issue were those of the in-court witnesses. The confrontation problem
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apparent explanation for this symmetry is a failure to recognize a distinction
between hearsay and confrontation. Other courts have, however, addressed
this issue in a related context where hospital records were sought to be in-
troduced directly in criminal proceedings under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. Although the majority of cases addressing this issue have
concluded that such records survive confrontation scrutiny if they survive the
hearsay rule, 289 the reasoning of these cases is largely inadequate. The vast ma-
jority simply equates hearsay exceptions with confrontation exceptions. 290 But
the recent Supreme Court decisions in California v. Green,
291 Dutton v. Evans, 292
Barber v. Page,293 and Pointer v. Texas294 expressly reject the reasoning of these
opinions.
One of the few cases which rejects the confrontation challenge to the use of
the business records exception in criminal proceedings after detailed analysis is
People v. Kirtdoll. 295 In that case the Supreme Court of Michigan acknowledged
that, although the hospital records sought to be introduced satisfied the state's
business record exception to the hearsay rule, the confrontation clause imposed
another hurdle for the admissibility of these records. 296 To determine whether
the records satisfied constitutional scrutiny under the confrontation clause the
court utilized dying declarations, a recognized exception to the confrontation
requirement as a reliability benchmark against which to measure business
records. 297 Although this approach and the court's conclusion that business
records are of equal or greater reliability than dying declarations is a
reasonable approach given the United States Supreme Court's lack of guidance
on the subject, the Michigan court's analysis falls short in other regards. The
decision to admit dying declarations combines assumptions of reliability with
the declarant's unavailability-trustworthiness plus necessity. 298 Indeed vir-
tually every exception to the confrontation requirement has turned upon
trustworthiness plus necessity. 299 Ordinarily those persons whose declarations
in Williams resulted not from the experts' out-of-court statements but rather from the out-of-court
statements of others, not present and testifying, upon which the expert based his opinion.
289 McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965); State v. Brier-
ly, 109 Ariz. 310, 509 P.2d 203 (1973); People v. Kirtdoll, 391 Mich. 370, 217 N.W.2d 37 (1974); State v.
Durham, 418 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1967); State v. Finkley, 6 Wash. App. 228, 492 P.2d 222 (1977); State v.
Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977).
290 With the exception of People v. Kirtdoll and State v. Olson, the cases set forth in note 289 supra fail to
distinguish between hearsay and confrontation.
291 399 U.S. 149.
292 400 U.S. 74.
293 390 U.S. 719.
294 380 U.S. 400.
295 391 Mich. 370, 217 N.W.2d 37. Seealso United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1943); State
v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977).
296 391 Mich. at 375, 217 N.W.2d at 42.
297 Id. at 378-80, 217 N.W.2d at 45-47. One of the difficulties in using dying declarations as a
benchmark for trustworthiness or reliability under a confrontation analysis is that the admissibility of dying
declarations is "rooted more in history than in reason." R. LEMPERT & A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 462 (1977). The psychological assumptions upon which admissibility is permitted are
highly conjectural. Thus, the use of this benchmark may result in confrontation exceptions of very ques-
tionable reliability.
298 "It is scarcely necessary to say that to the rule that an accused is entitled to be confronted with
witnesses against him the admission of dying declarations is an exception which arises from the necessity of
the case." Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899).
299 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (witness who testified at former trial beyond territorial
powers of United States); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (deceased witness testified at former
trial). But see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (co-conspirator's declaration); Dowdell v. United States,
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are contained in hospital records are available or at least the introduction of
these records is not premised upon actual unavailability; rather, it is inconve-
nience to the declarants or disruption of hospital functions that excuses the
presence of such witness in light of the assumed reliability of such records.
Whatever considerations of convenience may suffice to create a hearsay excep-
tion, the confrontation clause appears to require actual unavailability through
death or other situations where the good faith efforts of the proponent could not
bring forth the live witness. It is on this basis, a finding that inconvenience will
not excuse the requirement of confrontation, that the courts which reject the
hearsay confrontation symmetry have grounded their analysis.3 0 0 Thus, it is
argued, only where the declarant whose statement is contained in the hospital
record is actually unavailable should those records containing these statements
be admitted. 30'
Ultimately, in unraveling this issue, one must face the question whether
unavailability is absolutely a predicate to confrontation exceptions to be con-
sidered as a separate requirement, to reliability or whether the reliability
analysis subsumes this question. At present the resolution of this question must
focus on Dutton v. Evans, 3 02 which presented the constitutionality of a state rule
permitting admission of a co-conspirator's out-of-court declaration and
resulted in the sole confrontation exception which did not require a showing of
unavailability. The decision presented a sharply divided Court with a plurality
opinion, two concurring and one dissenting opinions.30 3 However, both the
plurality,304 and the concurring opinion of Blackmun and Burger rely in part
upon the harmless effect of the declaration at issue.3 0 5 If the Dutton plurality
opinion is simply an aberration explainable by notions of harmless error, then
unavailability survives as a requirement for confrontation exceptions. Indeed
the focus upon unavailability in the Court's subsequent opinion in Mancusi v.
Stubbs 06 bolsters the argument that the unavailability predicate survives. If,
221 U.S. 325 (1910). In the course of discussing exceptions to the constitutional requirement of confronta-
tion, the Dowdell Court noted, "[d]ocumentary evidence to establish collateral facts, admissible under com-
mon law, may be admitted in evidence." Id. at 330. The collateral facts discussed here appear to be the con-
verse of the "crucial witness" concept. See note 307 infra.
300 State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St. 2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967); Bennett v. State, 448 P.2d 253 (Okla. Cr.
Ct. App. 1968).
301 United States ex re. Henson v. Redman, 414 F.Supp. 678, 681 (D. Del. 1976).
302 400 U.S. 74.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 87.
305 Id. at 90.
306 408 U.S. 204. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, The Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor Deter-
mining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978); Comment,
The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1167 (1974);
The Supreme Court 1970 Term-Foreword: Right of Confrontation: Admissibility of Declaration by Co-Conspirator, 85
HARV. L. REV. 3, 194-96 (1971).
Professor Westen articulates the "rule" as follows:
Before it may use a witness' out-of-court statement, the court has an obligation to make a
"good faith effort" to produce the witness in person and, having produced the witness, to try to
elicit his evidence in the form of direct testimony under oath and in the presence of the jury.
Westen, note 306 supra, at 579. Westen proceeds to argue that business records should not be barred by the
confrontation clause because the defendant ordinarily has no interest in examining these out-of-court
declarants. Regardless of the wisdom of this observation generally, Westen acknowledges that its applica-
tion should be limited where the records contain psychiatric evaluations or reports where the defendant can
reasonably be expected to desire an examination of the declarant. Id at 615-19 n.143. Additionally,
Westen's assumption that the defendant would ordinarily have no interest in examining certain declarants is
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however, unavailability exists not as a distinct threshold requirement but
rather as one of the elements in the reliability calculus, hospital records satisfy-
ing the business records exception to the hearsay rule may well survive con-
frontation scrutiny.
But who is a witness for confrontation purposes; all persons who have
made relevant notations in the medical records? The Court's decisions suggest
that the witnesses who must be called to satisfy the requirements of the con-
frontation clause are those persons who are "principal" or "crucial"
witnesses. 30 7 Under this approach where the psychiatrist, for example, con-
cludes that a particular instance of past violence by the prospective patient
related to the physician by a third person is an essential fact supporting her
prediction of dangerousness this declarant is crucial and should be presented as
a constitutional condition precedent to receipt of the psychiatrist's opinion.
Conversely where, for example, the declarant's notation of her observation in
the hospital records that the patient took his prescribed medication is one of
many such observations used to support an opinion that the patient had ad-
justed to hospitalization it would not seem critical and thus presentation of the
declarant nonessential under the confrontation clause.
Should it be concluded that confrontation of a particular out-of-court
declarant is not constitutionally compelled, an alternative response to this issue
should be considered. Through the use of obligatory pre-trial disclosures the
patient's attorney could be notified of those out-of-court declarations which the
state will seek to introduce at the hearing.30 8 This notice would give the
patient's attorney the opportunity to examine the statement and determine
whether he should himself subpoena the out-of-court declarant or take other
steps to respond to this proposed evidence.
B. Miscellany
Where extra-judicial sources of information are utilized not merely as the
bases for expert opinion but are introduced directly as independent evidence of
a material issue, another set of hearsay and confrontation issues arises. This
evidence may be offered in various forms, but the two most likely are the
testimony of a live witness or a document in which these out-of-court
statements are recorded. The testimony of a live witness which contains an out-
of-court statement offered for its truth raises traditional hearsay issues which
should be addressed under a traditional hearsay analysis. No unique problems
problematic. Without knowing the issues involved in a particular lawsuit, the probative value of the records
on those issues, or the nature of the declaration, it is impossible to generalize that the defendant would have
no interest in examining the declarant at trial.
307 Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 GRIM. L.
BULL. 99, 129 (1972). See also United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1106-07 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 844 (1974).
308 See FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(5). These rules grant the trial court discretion to admit reliable
hearsay not excepted by the enumerated class exceptions set forth in those rules. As a condition precedent to
the admission of these statements, the proponent must, inter alia, give the adverse party advance notice of his
intention and the particulars of the statement. See also Westen, supra note 306, at 617.
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are present in the commitment setting which justify disparate treatment of
these hearsay questions.
30 9
The document which is likely to be offered into evidence is the patient's
hospital or medical records. Contained within these records may be numerous
categories of data, including the recollection of a staff members' interview with
the patient or his friends and relatives, various staff members' observations of
the patient on the ward and resulting opinions, psychiatric observation and
opinion, and medical or psychological test results. To the extent that all or a
portion of these sections of the patient's records are sought to be introduced at
the hearing they must be analyzed under all the same rules which apply to in-
court witnesses, including the hearsay rule.
Of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule which have evolved, the
two which are most relevant to a patient's medical records in a public
psychiatric hospital are the business records 310  and public records
exceptions .3t  Although hospital records have often been recognized as falling
within the business records exception, 31 2 this recognition does not result in
blanket admission of relevant records. The applicability of an exception to the
hearsay rule merely results in nonexclusion of such evidence on hearsay
grounds. The out-of-court declarant must still satisfy the requirements im-
posed upon in-court witnesses. The testimony must, for example, satisfy the
firsthand knowledge and opinion rules. And, to the extent that these records
contain privileged communications, these communications do not lose their
privileged status merely by being recorded in hospital records.
31 3




Under this approach courts have distinguished between recordation of routine
facts and more complicated diagnoses. 31 5 Where the facts observed and record-
ed in the hospital involve an essentially objective matter, such as the patient's
date of admission or administration of medication, the regularity of re-
cording imports a sufficient degree of trustworthiness to except application of
the hearsay rule. 316 However, where the matter recorded largely involves con-
jecture and opinion, courts have found the requisite degree of trustworthiness
present in such opinions insufficient to overcome any need for cross-
309 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1103. The hearsay exceptions likely to arise with a live witness'
narration of an out-of-court statement in the commitment process include FED. R. Evsn. 803(1) (present
sense impression, e.g., "Patient A is hitting patient B"); 803(2) (excited utterance, e.g., "Patient Ajust hit
me"); 803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, e.g., "I, A, intend to hit B"); and
803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, e.g., "Please help me, I cannot stop
myself from hitting B"). The use of these exceptions will not be required where the declaration is not
thought to be hearsay because it is, for example, an admission made by the patient a party to the action and
offered against him, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2), or because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, FED. R. EVID. 801(c), e.g., "I am Napoleon."
310 FED. R. EvID. 803(6). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, 703[2], at 703-12.
311 FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
312 McCormick, The Use of Hospital Records as Evidence, 26 TUL. L. REv. 371, 372 (1952). One aspect of
this exception which has occasionally troubled courts in applying this exception to hospitals, schools, and
churches is the status of such entities as a business. To avoid rejection of such evidence based upon profit
motivation as opposed to reliability, rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines business to include
"business institution, association, profession occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit."
313 McCormick, supra note 312, at 373.
314 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
315 E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 293, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
316 Id. at 300.
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examination. 317 One particular category of opinions subject to this rule has
been psychiatric opinions318 which are thought to be too conjectural to dispense
with cross-examination.
3 1 9
The business records exception contained in rule 803(6) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence does not classify particular sources of information such as
psychiatric opinion as being without the exception, rather it focuses upon the
trustworthiness of the records preparation. Specifically the rule presumes that a
recording made near the time of the event based upon personal knowledge and
regularly made and kept in that business activity is trustworthy. This presump-
tion may, however, be rebutted by a showing that "the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustwor-
thiness." 32 0 This criterion of rule 803(6) may yield the same result as the tradi-
tional exclusion of psychiatric opinions from the business records exception.
Thus application of the rule to a type of diagnosis which lacked demonstrated
reliability3 21 and whose use may result in a deprivation of liberty will compel
testimony of the live witness instead of the recorded diagnosis.
In addition the business records exception demands that "[e]ach partici-
pant in the chain producing the record-from the initial observer-reporter to
the final entrant-must be acting in the course of this regularly concluded
business.' '322 When a nurse routinely notes the medication administered to a
particular patient, as she is required by the hospital to do on each day, no
problem with this chain exists.
But where, for example, a staff member interviewing the patient's spouse
makes a note in the chart of the patient's past behavior related to this hospital
staff member by the patient's spouse, this recording would not satisfy the ex-
ception because the spouse was not acting in the regular course of business.
Thus, unless some other exception to the hearsay rule obtained to this portion
of the chain the entire statement would be barred by the hearsay rule.
323
If the institution whose records are sought to be introduced is a public
agency, admission of the records may be sought under the public records and
reports exception to the hearsay rule324 as the result of an agency investigation
or matter observed pursuant to a legal duty. However, the decision of the
317 Id. at 304.
318 Id. See also United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 64-65 (7th Cir. 1971); Birdsell v. United States, 346
F.2d 775, 779 (5th Cir. 1965); Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1965). But see
Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1962); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 738-39 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
319 It is of no reflection upon the profession of psychiatry to say that it necessarily deals in a field
of conjecture. Even in the diagnosis of actual insanity, cases are rare in which trained psychiatrists
do not come to opposite conclusions. The opinions here relate to a neurosis, a condition short of
insanity on which there are countless theories and infinite possibilities. It is difficult to conceive of
records in which the right of cross-examination is more important than the conjectures of a
psychiatrist on a psycho-neurotic condition.
147 F.2d at 304-05 (footnote omitted).
320 FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
321 See text accompanying notes 228-58 supra for a discussion of the alleged lack of reliability in
psychiatric diagnosis.
322 WEINSTEIN, supra note 12, 803(6)[02], at 803-152.
323 FED. R. EvID. 805.
324 FED. R. Evm. 803(8). Note that showing "a lack of trustworthiness" in the sources of information
will result in a rejection of the record. Thus, the presumed trustworthiness of public records may be rebutted
here, as well as in the business records exception.
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United States Court of Appeals in United States v. Oates325 casts doubt upon the
application of that exception in this situation. The public records exception to
the hearsay rule is inapplicable in criminal cases where the records contain the
observations of law enforcement personnel which are sought to be used against
the defendant.3 26 In Oates the court concluded that a government chemist who
tested a substance alleged to be an illegal narcotic was "law enforcement per-
sonnel" so that his report was excluded from the exception. 327 If commitment
proceedings are considered criminal,3 28 this same provision might preclude its
application to commitment proceedings by reasoning that the staff of a public
institution which involuntarily confines persons pursuant to a legislative
authorization are law enforcement personnel. These persons are "employee[s]
of a governmental agency which has law enforcement responsibilities."
329
Moreover, Oates concluded that this same bar on law enforcement reports
should apply to the business records exception. 3 0 If this interpretation is ac-
cepted in jurisdictions which have adopted a version of the Federal or Uniform
Rules of Evidence, then hospital records of the committing or examining
hospital may not be excepted from the hearsay bar by the business or public
records exception.
If these records survive scrutiny under the hearsay rule, the confrontation
clause questions which arise here may be answered by the analysis advanced in
the discussion of confrontation problems involved in extra-judicial bases for ex-
pert testimony. In each case a separate analysis of the hearsay and confronta-
tion questions must occur. The declarant's availability, reliability, and crucial
role in the proceeding must be evaluated as a constitutional condition of admis-
sion under the confrontation clause.
IV. Conclusion
Any discussion of the necessity of a physician or psychotherapist patient
privilege rests ultimately upon hunches which have not been validated by hard
data. Does the presence of a privilege for particular communications encourage
therapeutic relationships which would not occur in the absence of a privilege?
We simply do not know. If, however, there is any therapeutic relationship
where a privilege might be necessary, our best-reasoned hunches suggest that
the psychotherapist-patient relationship is such a relationship. The societal
stigma attached to mental illness and the personal or sensitive nature of the
problems brought to the psychotherapist suggest the need for private com-
munications between the patient and the psychotherapist. The cloak of privacy
occasioned by the creation of a privilege recognizes that we should encourage
efficacious treatment because of the net benefit to society when its members are
healthy in mind and body.
325 560 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1977).
326 FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
327 560 F.2d at 66-67.
328 See text accompanying notes 228-58 supra.
329 560 F.2d at 68. Private institutions carrying out this same legislative charge should be similarly
treated for purposes of this hearsay exception.
330 Id. at 68-72.
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Psychotherapeutic treatment is most likely to be effective if it is voluntary.
Thus a social policy favoring treatment should favor voluntary treatment
because of its efficacy and its respect for personal autonomy. One class of per-
sons who might benefit from voluntary treatment are those persons who now or
at some time in the near future may satisfy criteria for civil commitment. We
should encourage this class of persons to seek voluntary treatment rather than
subjecting them to involuntary treatment. Thus, if there is any justification for
a psychotherapist-patient privilege, it should not be excepted in civil commit-
ment proceedings lest we risk discouraging people from seeking treatment for
fear of subsequent disclosure and commitment.
Moreover, this exception to the privilege seems to be a vestige of the
medical model of commitment. In this model the physicians decided whether
commitment should occur. Psychiatric freedom to testify without regard to pa-
tient invocation of privilege is essential to this approach. The rejection of this
model should include rejection of its oddments which lacks present utility. The
harm to society when its members are unhealthy and the greater efficacy of
voluntary rather than involuntary treatment also supports a constitutional
right to privacy to protect psychotherapeutic communications from compelled
disclosure in civil commitment proceedings. The privilege and privacy
arguments break down, however, when the relation is not intended to be
therapeutic or is not voluntary. Confidentiality is not anticipated and ef-
ficacious treatment not likely. Thus, in the absence of institutional restructur-
ing in this context, informational demands for accurate judicial decision-
making prevail over any privilege or privacy arguments.
The other potential for limitation on disclosure of patient communications
is the privilege against self-incrimination. The crucial question here is whether
application of the privilege against self-incrimination when combined with a
rigorous standard of persuasion will undermine civil commitment. In the
absence of hard data, any conclusions are speculative. Civil commitment re-
quires proof of the proposed patient's mental illness. Direct evidence of mental
illness is unavailable. No witness will state that he observed the mental illness
as a distinct entity. Rather, witnesses are likely to state that they observed ver-
bal or nonverbal acts which the witness or fact finder may infer are consistent
or inconsistent with mental illness. Without the patient's explanation of these
acts and other standardized tests of the patient's thought processes, a danger of
ambiguity exists. Such ambiguous evidence when measured against a rigorous
standard of persuasion may not permit commitment.
Therefore, before other jurisdictions add the privilege against self-
incrimination to their list of patient protections in civil commitment pro-
ceedings a serious review of judicial decision-making in those jurisdictions
which apply the privilege in civil commitment proceedings should occur. If this
review concludes that the state's case is made more difficult but not impossible
by application of this privilege, the strongest argument against application of
the privilege against self-incrimination falls by the wayside. A series of difficult
but not insoluble problems remains.
If, however, application of the privilege against self-incrimination and a
serious standard of persuasion frustrates the commitment process, a weaker
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result is required. If civil commitment is constitutionally permissible, a deci-
sion to retain a civil commitment process leaves the standard of persuasion and
the privilege against self-incrimination for review. If the Supreme Court con-
cludes that a clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard of persuasion is constitutionally compelled in civil commitment pro-
ceedings, use of the privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment
proceedings will be ripe for attack.
The evidence in civil commitment proceedings ordinarily includes physi-
cian, psychiatrist, or psychologist testimony. Fear that these witnesses will con-
trol or confuse the fact finder has led to proposals for limiting or excluding their
testimony on certain issues or in certain terms. The danger in setting up such
obstacle courses for these witnesses is that a witness' testimony which is other-
wise helpful may be rejected for failure to step here or touch that base. Rather
than less testimony we should encourage more testimony. It is of little matter if
the witness uses a term of art from his discipline so long as this term is ex-
plained during his testimony and an opportunity to test the term's precision ex-
ists through cross-examination or the introduction of independent evidence.
Similarly, it is of little matter if the witness uses the statutory criteria for com-
mitment in-his testimony so long as the witness explains why he concludes that
these criteria are or are not met in this case.
To the argument that this class of witnesses really knows little about men-
tal illness the same response is appropriate-more testimony, not less. Do not
exclude psychiatric testimony but permit a full cross-examination of the
witness and the admission of independent evidence which bears upon the ex-
pertise of the witness. The fact finder should decide whether to accept the
opinions of the purported experts.
The decision to let the fact finder sort out competing or conflicting theories
of mental illness assumes not only that the fact finder could under-
stand these various theories but that the other side is provided a realistic oppor-
tunity to present this conflicting evidence. Increased jury sophistication sup-
ports submission of conflicting theories to them for resolution. Additionally,
most civil -commitment proceedings throughout the country are probably tried
to judges and not juries and thus the jury protection argument is inapplicable.
However, even if the fact finder could understand this evidence it does not
follow that the evidence will be presented.
Liberalization of the rules of evidence has been premised, in part, upon
the liberalization of discovery rules which permit an opponent the opportunity
to rebut or put in perspective particular evidence. Because of the short time
between the initiation of civil commitment proceedings and the civil commit-
ment hearing, full-blown discovery with depositions, interrogatories, requests
for admissions and related devices does not seem feasible. A topic for future
study and debate is the development of a modified discovery system for com-
mitment proceedings or the development of notice requirements to serve as a
substitute for discovery. Such a notice might, for example, describe the specific
acts upon which commitment will be sought, the names of the in- and out-of-
court declarants through which the state will seek to prove its case, and the
thrust of these declarations. In the absence of these pre-hearing disclosures, the
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admission of crucial evidence raising hearsay/confrontation problems must be
carefully considered.
Two limitations on the possible presentation of challenges to the witness'
expertise exist: counsel may not seek out such evidence and financial barriers
may prevent presentation of such evidence. The decision to permit introduc-
tion of psychiatric testimony given the acknowledged doubts of its validity
necessarily entails a realistic opportunity for the opposing party to challenge
this testimony. Therefore, admission of psychiatric testimony concomitantly
triggers a judicial commitment to eradicate the passive representation of pa-
tients and financial barriers to presentation of conflicting theories of mental
illness.
The justification which had been advanced in favor of civil commitment's
status as a stepchild of the legal system was that the best interests of the patient
required that certain trappings of standard judicial proceedings be excised from
civil commitment proceedings. We now recognize that the carving of a separate
niche for civil commitment proceedings was wrong and that the judicial system
must carefully scrutinize any significant governmental restrictions upon the
liberty of a human being-whether intended to kill or cure. Having thus
recognized civil commitment's place in the mainstream ofjudicial proceedings,
it would be unwise to begin carving another separate niche for civil commit-
ment by excepting the application of evidentiary rules applicable in other
judicial proceedings. Rather those rules of evidence which do come into play in
commitment proceedings should be rigorously applied. Normally the adver-
sary system supplies the requisite rigor. Where those forces which normally
prompt counsel to enter adversarial confrontation, the trial judge should exer-
cise a more active role in prodding counsel into the role of a competent and
zealous advocate; when necessary the judge should examine witnesses himself,
or as a last resort, report incompetent or less-than-zealous representation to the
bar association disciplinary committee. Short of this drastic alternative, mental
health advocacy training sessions should be encouraged by the bench and bar.
Where local mental health advocacy programs do not exist to provide a battery
of competent mental health lawyers, the judiciary should screen the appointed
attorneys to insure that only those with knowledge of mental health law and the
substantive disciplines with which it interfaces are appointed to represent pa-
tients in commitment proceedings. Finally, counsel should be reim-
bursed for his services in a manner which encourages rather than discourages
full preparation of a case.
Judicial systems of evidence are the product of hundreds of years of ex-
perience in dispute resolution. By comparison, rigorous judicial scrutiny of
civil commitment is in its infancy. Before rejecting any of these rules of
evidence in civil commitment proceedings it would be prudent to give them a
fair chance by utilizing them in the adversary context for which they were
designed.
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